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CORPORATE VICES AND CORPORATE VIRTUES:
DO PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTIONS MATTER?
CHRISTOPHER D.
INTRODUCTION:

"PUBLIC"

STONE t

AND "PRIVATE"

IN

THE

LIFE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

What is public, what is private, and who cares? These days,
to present a Symposium on The Public/PrivateDistinction is a bit
like staging a Tommy Dorsey revival. Most of legal scholarship is
caught up in the new sounds-"fairness/utility," "Rawls/Nozick,"
"property rules/liability rules"-public/private having slipped into
memory with the other old favorites. (Remember Durham/
M'Naghten and Neutral Principles?)
Surely it isn't that public/private has gone from favor on the
bench. Judges still give it an ear. Why, then, is it receiving so
little play in the journals?
Part of the answer is that scholarship, like anything else, is
subject to vogue. After a while, the variations one can delve from
a popular theme become exhausted, and the results too familiar.
But there is more to it than a fall from fashion. The substantive
objection is not so much that the terms have worn, as that they
have spread thin, extended into too many disparate contexts, in
each of which something different hangs in the balance. In one
situation, what we ultimately want to know is whether, in the circumstances, a distributor of leaflets can be ejected; 1 in another,
whether property can be "taken" by condemnation; 2 in still another, whether the police need a warrant to arrest.3 In each context public and private enter our thinking. But in each, the real
f Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law, University of Southern California.
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1See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 362
U.S. 501 (1946).
2
See Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959) (public
port enjoined from taking land by eminent domain because "public use" not shown).
3 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (front doorway of residence a "public place" for fourth amendment purposes, supporting warrantless
probable cause arrest).
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decisional force seems to be exercised by independent policies and
principles strong enough to bend public and private to the shape
they need.
Accordingly, there is not so much one "public/private" dichotomy, as several. Among them, there are family resemblances: some
criteria of public that are relevant to, for example, free speech
(what constitutes a public figure?) reappear relevant to searches
and seizures (what constitutes a public place?). But as we shift to
more remote contexts (what is a public purpose supporting a
municipal bond issue?) the considerations that shape our decision
are less recognizably similar. As a consequence, any scholar with
a curiosity about public/private is tempted, perhaps well-advised,
to carve out public and private this or public and private that, as
the only way around the vaguest abstractions or the slyest
tautologies.
If those are the substantive reservations that have warded recent scholarship from public/private (one finds their traces in most
of the Symposium's other contributions), they are more or less valid.
"More or less," because there are at least two legal languages in
which public/private is enlisted; doubts about the terms' importance are more valid as to the one language and less as to the other.
First, there is the language that courts and agencies employ in
the law's routine operating level: the language of rules and regulations, statutes and opinions. Transcending that is the legal "metalanguage" of policy statements and principles, the chat of academicians, many of whose terms never descend into the operating
language, but which serve to assess, direct, and nurture it.4
Public and private belong to a set of terms that have currency
in both languages. In the operating language, they claim a place
alongside "last clear chance" and "malice"; in the metalanguage,
alongside "fairness" and "utility." It is regarding the operating
language that the reservations about public and private are strongest, there generally being more severe objections to vagueness and
ambiguity when it comes to fashioning the workaday rules on the
steadiness of whose meanings communities must depend. By contrast, the requirements we impose on a term's acceptability in the
metalanguage are generally looser, and more pragmatic. A concept
has a valid place, as long as it can germinate good coherent insights.
Indeed, the very vagueness that is a vice in the operating level (for
4 1 have maintained elsewhere that there may be as many as four law-related

languages, often overlapping, with which law scholarship could be concerned.
Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YAiE L.J. 1149, 1175 n.84 (1981).
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example, in the definition of a crime) 5 may prove in the' metalaw
to be a virtue, precisely because it leaves room for the play of meaning on which the evolution of society depends.
These distinctive requirements affect the way in which: the two
languages are connected. Securities law, for instance, is informed
by the metalegal notion that some security issues that are broadly
traded (public) ought to be regulated differently from those whose
market is limited (private). But in implementing that policy-translating it into terminology workable on the operating levelprecise quantitative standards, based on such factors as numbers of
shareholders, serve as finely honed proxies for public and private,
which do not themselves make an appearance in the statutes.,
All this warns, if warning were needed, how seamless and forbidding the public/private distinction can become. But -it also
suggests the value of a symposium that promises to restore it to
scholarly respect and examination. With regard to the operating
language, my sense is that any grand effort to collect and unify all
the diverse functions public/private plays, context to context, would
produce a large compendium, but little insight. In this area,
scholars would better aim to identify the ocontext-specific criteria
for public and private, and even to encourage the development of
more precise surrogates (open, governmental, secret) when other
needs of the law, such as reckonability, require. But with regard
to their more general, metalegal usages, I doubt that there are
equivalent terms equally well freighted. A good society needs a
commitment that public/private matters, even allowing that the
over time, to matter in different ways in difterms are destined,
7
ferent areas.
5 Notwithstanding their apparent openendedness, even the terms public and
private may appear in the definition of some crimes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 314 (West Supp. 1982) (misdemeanor to expose one's "person, or the private
parts thereof, in any public place . . . .").
13Similarly, Title Virs proscriptions against discriminatory hiring never invoke
public and private as such. Instead the law speaks of employers (in commerce)
with 15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976) ("employer" covered by Act to include those employing fifteen or more persons). But what is that
number, other than a compromise of the values that contend in the metalaw under
color of public and private, including the proper limits of governmental power, and
the sorts of "persons" whose claims to liberty deserve recognition?
7
See, e.g., the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement on the fundamental
issues that revolve around public/private in the state action area:
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial
power. It also avoids imposing on the state, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed. A major
consequence is to require the courts to respect the limits of their own
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The present paper does not, however, aspire to all that, to
track public/private to its metalaw lair, and to examine it there in
its fullest original. Mine is a distinctly less heady, less heroic chore.
I have been asked to concentrate on the influence of public and
private in shaping the laws affecting corporate conduct, where corporate is broadly understood to include the whole range of formal
bureaucratic organizations, both those that are formally charteredordinary business corporations, incorporated charities, municipalities, nonprofits, and so on-as well as the host of unincorporated
bureaucracies, ranging from associations to governmental units such
as water districts and federal agencies. The task is to evaluate
how public/private distinctions might rightly affect society's judgment both as to what is expected of these organizations, and as to
the methods appropriate to make them behave accordingly.
Another paper, one which I have not written, might do well to
start with some theory-of the state, of personal liberty, of sociobiology-and to derive such public/private distinctions in the corporate field as the theory required. My strategy has been the
opposite tack: to begin with the public/private distinctions that
present law relies on in fact, and to build upward, toward the
theoretical abstractions and justifications.
In part I, I discuss how the growing effacement in traditional
distinctions between public and private activities and actors is clouding analyses that purport to turn on that dichotomy. But despite this
increasing ambiguity, the law appears determined to work with
some distinction along those lines. The balance of the article
examines the results of that determination in two broad regions
of law. Part II canvasses what I call the region of public immunities and private liabilities. In this region the corporate body stands
to win if it is characterized as public, but to lose, if private. Sovereign immunity is the paradigm example. In part III, I consider
the converse, the region of public liabilities and private immunities.
In this region, the corporate body bears liabilities if characterized
as public, but emerges immune if private. In this region, state
action cases provide the paradigm.
In dealing with each region, my aim is to summarize for the
Symposium's consideration some of the influence public/private
thinking has had on the law in the corporate area; to examine, in
power as directed against state governments and private interests.
Whether this is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political
order.
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2754 (1982).
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light of the considerations that dominate each region, what rational
warrant there may be for retaining distinctions based upon public
and private characteristics of the organization; and, to see 'whether
we can derive from the rationales some guidelines for characterizing
the hybrid actors and activities as one or the other-at least, in those
circumstances in which some sort of public/private distinctions
ought to continue to matter.
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THE LIFE OF LEGAL FICTIONS:

AN OvERviEw
A. The Complexity of Corporate Activity and Organization
Restricting our scope to the functions of public and private in
corporate law does not eliminate-it rather illustrates-the several
reasons those labels have come to be viewed warily. For even when
limited to public and private "corporations," the difficulties of
locating a single sense of public/private remain. One reason' is
that the world of bureaucratic actors and activities is so -complex
and shaded that it is difficult to distinguish the public from the
private by reference to any single clear set of standards. Another
is that as we move around this one field, we still find public and
private playing roles which, although more familial, are nonetheless distinct.
Let me start with the first impediment to a single unifying
conception, the hybrid character of social actors and activities. In
the abstract, we may have notions of what is private and what
public, but actual actors and activities rarely satisfy all our notions
of what it takes to be one or the other.
Begin with the problem of typing actors. Suppose, for example, we offer a distinction along the lines, of politics and markets
as a first slice: 8 "private" are those bodies that are constrained and
nourished through market exchanges; 9 "public," through political
act. A moment's reflection will show, however, that political incentives and market incentives are too entangled for us unambiguously to sort out organizations subject to the one from organizations
subject to the other. With the expenditures of federal, state, and
local governments running at $960 billion annually 10-over 1/3 of
8The reference is, of course, to C. LiNDBLOM, PoLrTs AND MAuEETS: TYM

Wonx's PorncAL ECONOMIC SYsTEMs (1977).9
The nonprofits ordinarily receive their wealth through donations from the
private sector, often supplemented with government support.
See generally

Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497 (1981).
10 U.S. DEPARTM[NT OF CoMMEcE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATIsTICAL
AcT OF T
UNrED STATES 276, table 468 (102d ed. 1981) (lists expenditures by all levels of government as $958.7 billion in 1980).
ABS
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GNP '-the extensive dependency of private companies on the
political trough is evident. And even the private companies reliant
on market exchanges, not politics, as the predominant source of
wealth are responding to signals that are heavily doctored, in amplitude and even in kind, by public -action: taxes, tariffs, patents,
public subsidies, labor laws, antitrust statutes, and so on. Viewing it
from the other side, the actors we think of as public are not detached from markets. The Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long
Beach-both public authorities ' 2-are engaged in earnest competition for transport handling revenues. Even more striking, municipalities, public authorities, and other public agencies compete
against the for-profits for funds -in
the bond market, and are increasingly conscious, not merely of their general financial condition but
even of the relative ratings of their bonds. 3
We can, of course, try to specify a list of organizational characteristics that would in general type a corporation as public or
private, all other things being equal. 14 But it seems impossible to
eliminate a large class of hybrids not clearly on one side or the
other. There are corporations that are market-oriented in their
sales efforts, but whose life in fact depends, as more and more economic life depends, on government licenses and other privileges.
There is an increasing number of corporations that are federally
chartered, whose boards are appointed by the President-with Senate
approval, that are subject to "sunshine" regulation, but whose employees are specifically declared not to be government employees. 15
For example, the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat),
is federally chartered, three of its fifteen directors are presidentially
appointed, and it is obligated to make certain special congressional
reports. At the same time, it is a stock corporation (within special
11 GNP for 1980 was $2.6261 trillion. Id. 420, table 699.
12Public authorities are public bodies that generally enjoy a legal, administrative, and financial autonomy beyond that of ordinary government agencies and
public corporations. See A. H. WA~srr, Trz FPunac's Busntzss: Tim PoncsAN
PacnTcs oF Gov

smN

ConpoiRATo-s 39-44 (1978).

1'See Special Report: State and Local Government in Trouble, Bus. WK;, Oct.
26, 1981, at 135, 154-58.
14By "organizational characteristics" (as opposed to "activities characteristics,"
see infra text accompanying note 22) I include (1) the organization's formal legal
status, e.g., whether a municipality, government agency, or business corporation;
(2) its principal source of funding, e.g., whether through the public purse or through
market exchanges/donations; and (3) the principal direction of its managerial
accountability, e.g., whether accountable to the electorate or to investors/beneficiaries/donors, etc.
15 See, e.g., Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 §201(a), 47 U.S.C. §396(b)
(1976) (creating the nonprofit Corporation for Public Broadcasting, "which will
not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government.").
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constraints) 16 and expressly -denominated "for-profit." 1 Another
sort of hybrid is resulting from court-approved settlements, particularly under the securities laws, whereby the selection of officers
and directors of otherwise private corporations has been subjected
to the approval of public agencies.' 8 In other instances, the bureaucratic offices of private companies, and some of the tasks expected
of those offices, have been shaped by public action, through judicial
remedy, 19 legislation,20 and regulation.2 1
It is not only the hybrid organizational characteristics of the
actors 2 that so often blurs the public/private distinction; boundaries between public and private activities are also unclearly
marked. Witness the distinct treatment that has been accorded
common carriers, inns, and like enterprises "affected with a public
interest," 23 and the conceptual shambles that have resulted from
trying to maintain the governmental-proprietary distinction in the
sovereign immunity field.24 Whatever lines may once have existed
are closer than ever to obliteration. Governments are in many
A See 47 U.S.C. § 734(b) (2) (1976) (ownership of voting Comsat shares
by authorized communications common carriers not to exceed 50%of shares issued
and outstanding).
17 See 47 U.S.C. §731 (1976).
' 8 See Matthews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC
Level Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAw. 1323 (1976) (reviewing securities cases
settled on terms that affect management and bureaucratic structure).
19 For example, a 1973 consent decree between AT&T and EEOC required each
major subdivision of AT&T to establish certain employment opportunity officers with
designated functions. See, e.g., AT&T Discrimination Settlement, 8 LAB. REL.
RFP. (BNA) (431 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 73, 87, 95-96. See generally, Stone,
The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YAiE
LJ. 1, 37-38 (1980).
2OAn example is the ordinary corporations code requirement that there be a
board of directors with certain powers, such as to declare dividends. See, e.g.,
MODEL Busmzss Corn,. AcT §§ 35, 45 (1979).
21
See, e.g., Current Good Manufacturing Practice for Finished Pharmaceuticals,
21 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-.208 (1981) (FDA regulations requiring pharmaceutical firms
to establish internal procedures assuring quality control as prescribed by the FDA);
10 C.F.R. § 21.21(a) (1982) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation requiring
licensees to adopt procedures to inform responsible officers of hazard indications).
22
See supranote 14.
23See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296-300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (discussion of common law obligations even of theatres, as well as of
common carriers, hotels, etc.).
24
See W. PRossER, HANDBoo oF = LAw OF ToRTs § 131, at 979 (4th ed.
1971) ("It has been said that the 'rules which courts have sought to establish in
solving [the meaning of the governmental-proprietary functions distinction in
municipal immunity doctrine] are as logical as those governing French irregular
verbs.'").
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traditionally private lines of business, such as land development,
railroading, insurance, and fuels production.m Meanwhile, traditional public services are increasingly available from the private
sector. It isn't just private mails. In California you can even rent-ajudge. 28 Many municipalities contract with for-profits to supply local
services such as refuse and even police and fire protection.2 7 The
federal government enlists private nonprofits to do its thinking
(Rand, Mitre), and to serve as intermediaries for the implementa28
tion of welfare programs.
Even in the face of all this hybridization, some may wish to
-press the search for some general essence of public/private. But I
doubt that the prospective rewards would warrant the effort. For
what we need is not merely a line (if we could produce it) that
clearly and intelligibly satisfies our intuitive notions about public
and private in general. We need definitions that suit specific legal
purposes, yielding whatever division is appropriate to the legal consequences that currently are, or should be, attached. And that
brings us to the other half of the problem. Even within the limited
domain of corporate conduct, we find the public/private distinction
invoked for guidance in several distinguishable subcontexts, each
with its independent, or semi-independent, senses. 29 In short, we
are asking of the same terms distinct and even unclearly related
functions.
25

By 1953, the federal government was the largest electric power pro-

ducer in the country, the largest insurer, the largest lender and the largest
borrower, the largest landlord and the largest tenant, the largest holder
of grazing land and timberland, the largest owner of grain, the largest
warehouse operator, the largest ship owner, and the largest truck fleet
operator.

A. H.

WALSH,

supra note 12, at 29. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32

Cal. 3d 60, 72, 646 P.2d 835, 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 681 (1982)

(action by

municipality to condemn franchise of National Football League team, court con-

firming that "acquisition and, indeed, the operation of a sports franchise may well
be an appropriate municipal function.").
28 See Note, The California Rent-a-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy
Considerations of Pay-as-you-Go Courts, 94 HtAv. L. REv. 1592 (1981).
2

7See S. SONENBLuM, J. Kiir= & J. Rms, How Crrms PovmE SmvicEs

6-7,

9-11 (1977).
28
See Musolf & Seid, The Blurred Boundaries of Public Administration, 40
PUB. AD. REv. 124 (1980) (reviewing the ever-increasing use by government of
"quasi-government" or "quasi-private" organizations, including nonprofit intermediaries utilized by the Department of Labor to handle key components of the
1977 Youth Employment and Demonstration Program).

29 For example, a private (in the sense of investor-owned, for-profit) corporation can issue securities in either a public or private manner, e.g., to the public at

large, or to a restricted universe of investors.
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B. The Public/Private Distinction in the Sorting of
Immunities and Liabilities
Of the corporate subcontexts in Which the public/private
dichotomy has a role to play, two have had aparticularly significant
history. The two contexts are best distinguished by assuming the
position of counsel defending an organization that has hybrid characteristics (as all organizations have, in some degree). First, there
is a region of law in which public bodies are immune from liabilities to which their private counterparts are exposed.30 In this
region, a defendant will seek to be characterized as public-for example, the government contractor or licensee that hopes, by pulling
the covers of sovereign immunity its way, to avoid punitive damages in a tort suit.
Second, there is a region in which the advantages are reversed.
Liabilities are attached to public bodies in circumstances in which
their private counterparts would be immune."' Hence, in the
second region, defendants are likely to seek the benefits of a private
characterization: the educational institution that discriminates as to
race or dress code, or prohibits a campus club for homosexuals; the
company-owned "town" or shopping center that wants to exclude
pamphleteers; the landlord that wants an eviction, or a utility that
wants to terminate service, unencumbered in either case by procedural due process.
Unfortunately, it is easier to characterize these two regions by
reference to strategic advantages under current law than to identify
the types of conduct or claims that have been sorted into each
region. Generally, the conduct the law accords the treatment of
the first region is of a sort that hazards life and limb-the subject,
32
essentially, of common law delicts.
By contrast, in the second region, the conduct being questioned
is typically not of a sort recognized by common law torts and
crimes. The paradigmatic claim is for a constitutional right, the
most visible and celebrated controversies pivoting around the Constitution's state action requirements. I shall refer to the obligations
in this region as "fairness obligations," because at the bottom, what
30
3

See infra notes 44-136 and accompanying text.

1 See infra notes 137-243 and accompanying text.
321 am using "delicts" to include a whole range of unlawful conduct, excluding
contract liabilities, but including behavior giving rise to money liabilities for ordinary
tort damages, punitive damages, civil penalties, or criminal fines. I qualify with
"common law" because (one of the complications of my regional division) there are
fines and damages-and not merely injunctions-for highly disfavored, constitutionally based wrongs, as under the civil rights acts.
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is wanted is that the organization show respect for persons, be
even-handed, considerate, tolerant, understanding, and empathic.
In effect, the claim is that we incline to characterize as public
those organizations that ought to be, in a way I shall elaborate, a
model of virtue.33 This preference may explain, in part, our readiness to rely on structural injunctions as relief in the second region:
we enjoin upon the organization bureaucratic and procedural
rectitude.'
It is difficult, however, to give any account of the divvying that
results from this dichotomy which does not seem riddled with
apparent, perhaps irredeemable anomalies. The tenant of a public
housing project stands in a relatively good position vis-a-vis a rent
increase,3 5 but not so, should the building collapse on him.3 6 A
recipient of public welfare is entitled to a hearing before termination of benefits, 37 but cannot recover compensatory damages if the
welfare agency defames him.38 A state 39 can fix prices with relative
impunity 40 but will have to explain itself if it wants to establish a
dress code.41 The public sector employees emerge better protected
than their private counterparts as to their jobs, 42 but less so as to
33 See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
34See infra-notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
35 See Annot., 28 A.L.R. FED. 739 (1976).
36
It is more difficult to obtain tort recovery, especially punitive damages,
against the government than against a private party. See infra notes 52-61 and
accompanying text.
37

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process re-

quires evidentiary hearing.prior to termination of welfare benefits).

3
SCf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (injury to "reputation" caused by
police distribution of respondent's name and photograph on "active shoplifters" list

will not support federal claim for deprivation of civil rights).
39 Perhaps, however, a city does not have the same leeway as does the state

in which the city is located. See Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder,'102 S. Ct. 835 (1982) ("home rule" municipality held not to enjoy state
action exemption from liability under the Sherman Act); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (municipal utility liable to
antitrust counterclaim, its operation not being deemed "pursuant to state policy to
displace competition.").

40 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (federal antitrust laws do
not prohibit a state "as sovereign" from imposing certain anticompetitive restraints

"as an act of government.").
41See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971) (public school
dress code invalid absent showing that such regulation necessary to fulfill institutional mission).
42

For example, the public sector employee may have a constitutionally protected interest in his employment, mandating a due process hearing if discharge
will create a defamatory impression. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
573 (1972) (dictum). A municipal employer may not even raise a good faith
defense to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on a procedureless firing in such circumstances. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Consti-
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their limbs.4 3
On the other hand, despite the ambiguities and anomalies, the
law seems committed to revolve its strategy for controlling corporate
conduct around these two public/private axes. Taking this commitment, however inexact, as a given, the next two parts will attempt to refine the sorts of public/private differences that might
justly play so influential a role. I will look first at the region of
public immunities and private liabilities, and then at its converse.
II. THE REGION OF PUBLIC IMMUNITIES, PRIVATE LIABILIrES
In the first region, the conduct typically is what the common
law commentators would have deemed a delict.4 The predominant
aim of the law is to restrict the wrongful conduct -within the efficiency and fairness constraints commonly associated with deterrence
objectives. 45 In this region, such influence as the 'public/private
distinction has had can be traced to two fundamental deterrence
strategies. I will call these the liability and the interventionist
strategies, respectively.
A. Two Fundamental Strategies for Controlling
Corporate Misconduct
The liability strategy is to threaten the organization with loss
of a valued resource should it do the thing we do not want it to do.
Most often, the threatened resource is a fixed sum of money, as in
tutionally protected- rights aside, public employees are generally in a superior
IGrETS OF THE PuBc EMPLOYEE (1678);
position by statute. See R. Dwosxmr,
Note, Federal Employment.-The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978-Removing
Incompetents and Protecting "Whistle Blowers," 26 WAYNE L. REV. 97 (1979).
Nonetheless, the job rights of private sector employees are being increasingly protected by a growing body of law. See infra note 143.
43
Governments are freer to hazard their workers because of both the unavailability of punitive damages as a deterrent, and the inapplicability of OSHA to
units of government See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5)
f 1976) (exempting from OSHA's coverage "'the United States or any State or
political subdivision of a State."). Any disadvantages public sector employees
suffer regarding health and safety because of laxer requirements on their employers
should be mitigated by competition in the labor market: over a period of time, the
compensation of public sector employees should be expected to rise to account for
the uncovered hazards.
44
See supranote 32.
45 With respect to some delicts, e.g., overweight trucks, our restrictive efforts
are constrained by the direct and indirect, market-measured costs of the restriction
and its enforcement. With respect to more culpable delicts, e.g., the willful hazarding of life and limb, our efforts are less constrained by market-measured costs and
benefits, and freer to adjust to indignation. I am assuming that in either case,
whatever ceiling on restrictive effort is collectively approved, delict by delict, common considerations of efficiency and fairness will govern.
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the case of ordinary civil judgments, punitive damages, civil penalties, and criminal fines. For purposes of a more general discussion,
however, we can group with this strategy other authoritative deprivations, such as ineligibility to receive public funds,4

accreditation, 47

license, 48

6

and the loss

charter.49

of
or
-What unifies these meas5
0
ures into a single strategy
is that in all these cases the society
seeks to modify the organization's conduct indirectly, through the
specter of- after-the-fact repercussions. The managers are not told
how to avoid the misconduct; they are told only what will happen
if themisconduct occurs. It is up to the managers to devise what
they judge to be the most cost-effective response to the prospect of
legal penalties, just as they are left free to adapt to the prospective
'"penalties" of the market.
The interventionist strategies are employed ex ante. Rather
than. trust the managers to work out compliance and avoidance
measures at the organization's (and in some circumstances, the
managers' personal) jeopardy, the desired preventives are prescribed
directly. Collective choice displaces managerial choice with regard
to such matters as monitoring and disciplining agents, selecting
factors of production, and .adjusting output levels.51
The connection between the liability-interventionist distinction
and the public/private debate is expressed in sovereign and intergovernmental immunity.52 These doctrines leave us free to employ
40See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §74.110-.116 (1981)

(provisions for close out, sus-

pension, and termination of Department of Education grants to institutions); 47
Fed. Reg. 12,038, 12,042 (1982) (proposed March 19, 1982, to be codified at 10

C.F.R. § 600.27(b)). (Dept. of Energy may debar firms from receiving grants on
various grounds including crimes indicating a lack of business integrity).
47
See McQuiston, A Hospital in L.L Loses Accreditation, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3,
1981, at B2, col. 1 (disaccreditation of psychiatric center due to staff, record-

keeping, and fire safety inadequacies threatens loss of $16.5 million in federal
funds).
4

sSee Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2135 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
(providing for suspension or revocation of license for violation of antitrust laws).
49 The revocation of a charter for corporate wrongdoing has been preached
more often than practiced, but does not die as an idea. See H.R. 7481, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 403 (1975) (provision of bill to establish a federal corporate chartering
commission would, empower commission to revoke the charter of corporations in
event of certain violations),
50 Although I lump these approaches together in text, there are, of course,
significant distinctions. For example, it may be far preferable to modify the
behavior of an entity through finely calibrated penalties than through blunter sanctions that may overdeter or punish unfairly, such as withholding the corporation's
funds, ousting it from its charter, or debarring it from government contracting.
See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
51 With regard to the distinction between liabilities and interventions generally,
see Stone, supra note 19, at 11-45.
521n technical usage, sovereign immunity denotes the immunity of a sovereign
from suit by one of its own citizens in its own courts; intergovernmental immunity
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against a private -actor the whole gamut of legal devices; the revealed preference traditionally has been to use liabilities rather
than interventions, and thus to place the private bureaucracy, like
the private bedroom, beyond public view and reach. But against
the public actor, the portrait is more complicated. There is some
evidence that, when judicial action against public entities is not
blocked by the doctrines, the preference reverses: to favor interventions over liabilities, so that we incline to make, for example, a
nonconforming prison or school system put its house in order by
injunction rather than by threat of fineY3 There are many other
circumstances, however, in which relief against public actors is foreclosed by the immunity doctrines. So far as concerns conduct in
which we do not want our public bodies to engage, we are thrown
back upon the political process to ensure accountability, appointing, recalling, and defining the tasks of our public servants in the
the courts.
ordinary political ways, rather than through
Today, much of sovereign immunity, however far it may once
have extended, 4 has been waived-at least for compensatory judgments stemming from ordinary tortsY5 That is not to say the distinction has been buried. The waivers are typically riddled with
exceptions. The Federal Torts Clams Act,56 for example, excludes
claims arising from certain services, 5 7 those incurred by certain
named agencies,15 and those of a certain character including a host
of intentional torts such as false arrest, false imprisonment, and
defamation. 9 Moreover, more stringent rules of respondeat superior
denotes the immunity of one government to suit by another. The latter term may
also cover restrictions on suits against one government (by any plaintiff) in another
government's forum.
53See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
54The original extent of sovereign immunity, at least as far as municipalities
are concerned, has been subject to some recent revisionism. See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (suggesting that municipal immunity from tort
suit in 19th century was not far-reaching). For a relatively contemporary account,
see W. WmLmms, THE LInx'rrv OF MuNiciPAL CoRPoRATIONS FOR TORT 1-23
(1901) (summarizing 19th century law.).

55 See, e.g., Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d
709 (1978) (abrogating sovereign immunity against state of Pennsylvania for torts
of its agents).
56 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
57 E.g., postal delivery, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), and tax collection, id. § 2 680(c).
68E.g., Tennessee Valley Authority, id. § 2680(1); Panama Canal Co., id.
§ 2680(m); Federal land banks, Federal intermediate land banks, or banks for
cooperatives, id. § 2680(n).
59 See id. § 2680(h) (excluding "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,

slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights"). That
section was amended to make the Federal Tort Claims Act applicable to acts or
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typically prevail, so that governments probably bear narrower exposure for their agents' conduct than does the ordinary private
corporation. 60 Perhaps most significantly, the fact that a sovereign
has waived its immunity for ordinary civil awards does not, of itself,
expose it to liability for judgments of a predominantly punitive
and deterrent nature, such as exemplary judgments and fines, whose
employment against public actors remains exceptional."'
The traditional distinctions in treatment are under strain elsewhere as well. In a few circumstances, the sorts of interventionist
measures associated with public bodies are being tried out on private corporations. 62 In one case, a federal court threatened an oil
company, a recidivist polluter, with a partial receivership over its
pollution abatement program 63-an obvious echo of the "structural
relief" decrees in the public area. From the other side, the traditional immunities of public agencies show signs of weakening even
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the U.S. Government. See
Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 250 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §2680(n)
(1976)).
60 Note that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) provides that the United States shall
be liable for negligent acts or omissions of any government employee "while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." But this cannot be
taken literally in light of the limitations on liability built into the Federal Tort
Claims Act. For example, although an ordinary principal is liable for its agent's
torts committed in the course of the principal's business, the plaintiff suing the
government must also show that the agent's acts were not of a "discretionary" character. This results in immunity for the government in circumstances in which a
private person would be liable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
61 Compare City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)
(punitive or exemplary damages exceptional remedy, not recoverable from municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) with Monell v. New York Dep't. of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities held liable for ordinary civil damages
for civil rights deprivations under the same section). See generally Annot., 1
A.L.R. 4th 448, 454-59 (1975).
By way of contrast, it is quite likely that charities liable for ordinary damages
are liable also for punitive damages. See Allard v. Church of Scientology of California, 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1976)
(punitive damage judgment of $50,000 awarded against religious corporation for
malicious prosecution of former member). California immunizes public entities
from exemplary or punitive damages under any circumstances. See CAL. Gov'r
CoDE § 818 (West 1980); see also Austin v. Regents of University of California,
89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 358, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420, 422 (1979); A. VAN ALsTYNE,
CAIFOINIA GOVERNMENT TORT Lu~nrry § 2.36 (1980).
62 See supranotes 18-21.
63 The District Court was, however, overrued. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972) (overruling as unduly onerous a district
court's imposition of a probation order requiring a company to instate an oil spill
containment program). See Comment, The Application of the Federal Probation
Act to the Corporate Entity, 3 U. BALT. L. 11Ev. 294 (1974) (discussing case in
the context of corporate probation generally).
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from punitive judgments." In effect, we are witnessing some effacement of traditional public/private distinctions through a modest
convergence: private entities are being treated more like public
ones-their autonomy over "internal" decisions being displaced and
hedged by societal choices-and the public ones more like the private-subject to penalties.
This trend may be proceeding only gingerly in the courts, but
stands out more prominently if we include other sources of control,
specifically, government contracting and licensing. Increasingly,
societal preferences concerning how an organization should avoid
liability-creating misconduct 6 are being expressed by conditioning
the receipt of governmental benefits upon a corporation accepting
specified internal controls, independent of whether the beneficiary
is, in any respect other than the benefit, private or public. For
example, the recombinant DNA safety guidelines affect procedures
of any laboratory receiving National Institute of Health funds; 61
and the Department of Health and Human Services requires
grantees doing human subjects research to establish an in-house
64
See, e.g., Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
(punitive damages against municipality upheld; court interpreting city's ,waiver of
tort immunity to extend to all actions against the city "in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied by the Courts of this Commonwealth against any
other party defendant." Id. 683 (quoting Philadelphia Code, ch. 21-700 (1962)).
Recently, the Federal District Court in Kansas held a school district liable for
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, distinguishing City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981), on the basis that City of Newport was a section
1983 action, in which distinct considerations governed. See Boyd v. Shawnee
Mission Public Schools, 522 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Kan. 1981).

85 1 am referring here only to conduct which, if not corrected, would lead to
ordinary civil or criminal litigation. For example, in regard to the Health and
Human Services protections discussed in text accompanying note 67, presumably
a human subject would have a cause of action against an abusive institution that
injured him. The contractual term is intended to prevent the harm, notwithstanding the prospect of an after-the-fact remedy. In other situations, more characteristic of the conduct found in Region HI, the misconduct being questioned, for
example, racial or sexual discrimination, may not as readily lend itself to traditional
damage remedies; injunctions may be better suited, particularly if, as I propose, it
is not merely an individual's rights that are being secured, but a "public good."
66

See National Institute of Health Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research,
45 Fed. Reg. 6,724 (1980), amended at 45 Fed. Reg. 25,366 (1980) and at 45
Fed. Reg. 50,524 (1980) (mandatory DNA experimentation guidelines for all
institutions receiving federal support from NIH). The Food and Drug Administration previously published a Notice of Intent to Propose Regulations, 43 Fed.
Reg. 60,134 (1978), which would effectively extend the 1976 NIH regulations to
all manufacturers, by requiring guidelines to be followed as a condition of FDA
approval when products prepared by recombinative technology are submitted. See
generally, Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the
Authority of FDA to Require Complianc with the Guidelines, 35 FOOD, IRuG,
Cosm. L.J. 633 (1980) (critical of rules and FDA's position).
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Human Subjects Protection Committee.6" Also, as a condition of
license, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires any
nuclear facility to establish certain internal procedures, without
regard to whether the facility is investor-owned or public. 68
B. The Choice of Strategy
But why should there be any distinctions at all? In the context of Region I, the prescriptive question might be put this way:
in selecting strategies for deterrence-in particular, in choosing between monetary judgments and interventionist techniques-what
significance should be attached to various generally public-making
or private-making characteristics of the organization? 69
1. Prescriptive Considerations Other than the Public/Private
Characteristics
Note that in focusing on the public and private characteristics
of the organization, we are isolating only one group of the several
factors that inform the selection of deterrence strategy. To appreciate the larger range of concerns-and to put the contribution
of organizational characteristics in perspective-we begin with the
premise that if a lawmaker were omniscient, there would be reason
to prefer interventions to liabilities against any sort of organizational actor, public or private. That is, if the lawmaker knew (a)
what conduct and outcomes were collectively disfavored, (b) the
marginal social product that a marginal reduction in the undesired
outcomes warranted, and (c) the costs and benefits of each of the
various measures that could be applied to reduce those outcomes,
it would be more efficient 70 to prescribe the avoidance measures
67

See 42 U.S.C. §2891-3(a)

(1976); 45 C.F.R. §46.112 (1981)

(requiring

entities applying for grants under the Public Health Service Act to establish review
committees for research involving human subjects funded by HHS); DuVal, The

Human Subjects Protections Committee: An Experiment in Decentralized Federat
Regulation, 1979 Am. B. FOUND. RESEAiCH J. 571.
68
See 10 C.F.R. at 50 App. B, III (1981) (design control) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees required to delegate verification and monitoring of
design measures to individuals other than those who performed original designs);
see also id. XVIII (audits) (requiring periodic audits to be performed by personnel
independent of areas being audited).
69 The question has significance not only in the formulation of rules, but also.
in guiding the exercise of official discretion, which often contemplates not just a-

range of penalties, but a substitution of techniques. Under the Water Pollution
Control Act, for example, a court may either fine an entity or subject it to an
injunctive order that is interventionist. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980) (administrator empowered to order compliance with permit limitation or to.

bring civil action for penalty).

70 Efciency is not, of course, the sole constraint on the law.

1982]

CORPORATE VICES

directly, displacing managerial autonomy over factors of production,
bureaucratic structure, and so on, with the solution that was
socially ideal. 7'
In the real world, however, lawmakers are not omniscient.
The more that interventionist regulations are fleshed with invasive.
detail, the greater the risks of imposing costs that exceed the benefits. If the corporations subject to the regulations comply, innovation is inevitably stultified. And the restrictions may prove illusory,
anyway, in light of any organization's capacity, and inclination, to
subvert and coopt externally imposed controls and their agents. 7 Hence, in general (that is, putting aside for a moment qualifications that may have to be introduced by virtue of significant
public or private characteristics of the organization), there are
reasons to hesitate using interventions. Moreover, there is much
to be said in favor of monetized penalties, their rivals. First, penalties can be finely calibrated to express the collective preference
that some proscribed outcome not occur. This does not mean that
penalties have been perfectly tailored in practice. The expected
penalty 73 may be off in either direction, either underrestricting an
objectionable outcome or overrestricting beneficial behavior that is
associated with it. Indeed, under conditions of "bounded rationality," 74 there are several reasons, including whimsical application,
why the prospect of penalties, particularly jury-awarded punitive
damages, may be lost sight of in the flood of other data competing
for the organization's attention. 5 But at least in the instance of
71 This, the "political" interventionist resolution, will be particularly favored the
more society prefers prevention to after-the-fact compensation and punishment.
This preference may be strengthened by, for example, the anticipation of high
litigation costs (exacerbated by after-the-fact proof), the uneasiness about monetizing certain injuries, and the possibility of bars to satisfaction of judgment.
72 See Stone, supra note 19, at 38-39.
73 The expected penalty is the product of (1) the probability of the actor
being not only caught but convicted and penalized, and (2) the magnitude of the
penalty, discounted to present value. Hence, it can be varied either by taking
measures to increase detection and conviction or by increasing the penalty level.
74 The "bounded rationality" concept provides that because information-gathering and processing represents a cost, managers, in lieu of seeking the unique
optimal solution to a problem, will accept a solution that meets certain minimal
aspirations within constraints determined by the marginal information costs. See

Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 Am. EcoN. lEv.
493, 495, 501 (1979).
75 [T]he law and its contingent liabilities constitute only a small range
of the threats that the corporation faces in dealing with the outside world.
• . . Thus, there are any number of areas from which profits may be
enhanced or threatened . .

.

. And of these, the law is not likely to

occupy the foreground of the businessman's attention.
C. SToNE, WHEnE =nE LAw ENsS 39-40 (1975); see also Stone, supra note 19, at
22 n.87.
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legislated penalties (as distinct from punitive damages), the authorized maximum constitutes a clear ceiling subject to collective discussion. By contrast, the costs that complying with interventions
entail-for example, forcing companies to establish internal audit
controls 76-are difficult to calculate, difficult to contain, and may
well entail expenditures that exceed the penalties the legislature
would choose for the consummated wrong the interventions were
77
enacted to avert.

The second general advantage of monetized penalties is flexibility. The threat of a penalty is inducement for the managers to
comply, but it leaves them free to devise-and, when prudent, to
revise in the course of experience-the most cost-effective method.

By contrast, interventions, by displacing managerial judgment with
the long and relatively uninformed arm of the lawmaker, exacerbate
the risks of error.
Elsewhere I have examined how these conflicting advantages
and disadvantages of the two techniques might be weighed in
particular circumstances, depending upon, among other things, the
correlation between the constraint and the hazard it seeks to avoid,
the character of the risk, and the adequacy of after-the-fact remedies. 78 From those considerations, one can determine, for example,
that in safeguarding against the theft of nuclear fuel, some dose of
interventionist measures, such as government-promulgated standards as to how fuel is to be monitored and safeguarded within fuel
processing facilities, will be preferred to (or a necessary supplement
to) the specter of after-the-fact penalties should some of the fuel be
spirited off.79
But the question I am putting here is narrower: whatever
balance between monetized penalties and interventions is indicated
in any particular circumstance by the character of the hazard, etc.,
is there any independent reason to shift our relative reliance from
one strategy to the other, based upon the organization's mix of
public or private characteristics? In the terms of the nuclear fuel
processor, is there any reason to alter the balance between inter76 E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) § 102, 15 U.S.C.
§78m(b)(2)(A), §78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981); see supra note 68.
7715 U.S.C. §78ff(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides for a fine not to exceed
$1,000,000 for violations of FCPA when the offender is a corporation. One company estimated that it would cost three million dollars to develop the mandated
management report. See Note, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: An Alternative Perspective on SEC Intervention in Corporate Governance, 89 YALE LJ. 1573, 1592 n.95 (1980).
78
See Stone, supra note 19, at 39-40.
79 See id. 13-16, 19-28.
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ventionist and penalty strategies depending upon whether the
utility handling nuclear fuel is investor-owned or municipal?
2. Prescriptive Considerations Derivable From Public or
Private Organizational Characteristics
As the survey of existing law indicates, liabilities, particularly
penalties, have been disfavored when public units are concerned.
To organize the analysis that follows, I will examine six bases that
might be advanced for considering liabilities relatively inappropriate when the target of the law is a public rather than a private
organization.
a. Differences in the OrganizationalMotive
Whether or not we have done so consciously, some disparity
in treatment almost certainly arises from different assumptions that
are commonly made about public and private actors regarding
motive or attitude. Suppose, for illustration, two cases in which
public health is jeopardized, the one by a private pharmaceutical
house engaged in cancer research, and the other by a publicly
funded and operated laboratory involved in the same projects. A
different quality or depth of indignation might be aroused by the
company that hazards health "for profit" than by the public laboratory that does so in the pursuit of science, and whose successes
would be more ratably shared among the whole population, rather
than a group of investors. If so, we would expect less readiness to
employ punitive damages against the public entity.
Whether that sentiment is defensible is another question. If
the aim of the law is to sensitize the callous, it is not easy to say on
whom we need be harder. Private industry has its bad record on
brown lung and asbestosis. On the other hand, the United States
Public Health Service "studied" syphilis among hundreds of black
males, when it ought to have been curing them.8 0 To satisfy
national defense needs, and curiosity, the U. S. Army, paraded its
employees onto the perimeter of a nuclear weapons test-and into
80

E.g., G. ANNAS, L. Gr.ATs & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMN
(1977); N. HEnsimy & R. Mm=E, Hr N EXPEr-

EXPERIMENTATION 259-61
MENTATION AN nm LAw

8-10 (1976) (beginning in the 1930's, the U.S.P.H.S.
chartered the course of untreated syphillis in approximately 400 black males, providing them no treatment, and indeed taking measures to prevent the participants
from receiving syphillis treatment elsewhere, even though, by the early 1950's,
penicillin had been widely recognized as a safe and effective cure. Of the 400
subjects, an estimated 107 died from the effect of syphlis).
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a high risk of leukemia."' In fact, those in quest of profit may be
more circumspect about the risks they are posing than those who
can more glibly rationalize their every action as taken in the
"public interest."
In the last analysis, it seems to me that any case for distinct
treatment that has to appeal to general presumptions about which
group has the superior motives or attitudes will be inconclusive.
I will therefore assume that, to deter unwanted conduct, the price
we should be willing to pay (in direct enforcement costs and foregone social resources) is independent of the organizational character
of the actor subjected to controls. In the terms of our pharmaceutical illustration, this comes down to saying that to avoid contamination, we should expend as much to protect ourselves from
public laboratories as from private. Observe, however, that this
assumption leaves open our principal question: whether we should
prefer to expend whatever amounts are justified through monetized
penalties, with their associated costs, or through interventions,
with theirs.
b. Differences in Independent Legal Rules
The answer to this question-what balance to strike between
money judgments and interventions-depends on how other variables in the law are resolved. It is fruitless to debate whether a
particular organization should be liable to or immune from various
money judgments, without accounting for the whole matrix of rules
that form the legal background in which public and private institutions operate-rules that spell out distinct treatment regarding
limited liability, indemnification, respondeat superior, liability of
individual agents, and so on.
In some cases, a discrimination in the treatment the liabilityimmunity rules accord public and private actors may even serve to
correct for distinct treatment produced by the corollary rules. For
example, assume a proprietary hospital faces the prospect of punitive damages which its competitor, a municipal hospital, does not.
This seems to advantage the public over the private. But then
consider that the proprietary hospital owners enjoy limited liability.
By contrast, if the municipal hospital should face so heavy a judgment that to satisfy it would break the municipality bank, the
municipality, lacking an analogue to limited liability, might face a
81 See Berreby, Nuclear Time Bomb, Natl. L.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 1
(reviewing attempts by veterans of Army nuclear tests to receive compensation for

alleged radiation caused defects).
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mandamus to compel it to raise the wherewithal.3 2 As .a,'consequence, the apparent disparity in public/private treatment that one
infers from the sovereign immunity rules is misleading: although
theprivate corporation may be treated more sternly in liability
theory, those who stand behind it may yet come off better- in
judgment-satisfying fact.
There are important implications, too, in the different rules
for agency. In general, public entities are less likely than private
ones. to suffer judgments arising from their agents' misdeeds,83
either directly or through indemnification.84 And of course public
officials generally enjoy greater personal immunity from suit than
their private sector counterparts.85 The result is to forego (at least,
to limit) one of the potentially most effective controls over the misconduct of public organizations-sanctions that operate directly on
their officers.
Ideally, all of these variables should be dragged into the light
and examined together. They all constitute, together with the liability rules, a single tapestry. But to undo woof and warp at once,
and then to restore the filaments into some new pattern, lies well
beyond my current design. Instead, I will regard the rules of
matrix as independently fixed beyond review, and treat the liability
or immunity from monetary judgment as the dependent variable
within the purview of revision.
82That is, mandamus may lie to compel municipalities to exercise their taxing
power if that should be required to satisfy judgments against them. See Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515 (1880) (court may by mandamus compel
city to raise, through taxation, funds 'required to satisfy holders of overdue, unpaid
bonds); cf. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e) (1976) (regarding penalties for municipal polluters, compulsory joinder of the state with the
municipality is available when the municipality has been sued, the state to be
liable for judgment and expenses entered against the municipality when state law
prohibits the municipality from raising the revenues to comply with the judgment).
17 MuNsc'AI. Com'on.riAoNs § 51.46 (rev. vol. 1967).
See generally, McQunm..,
83
See supra note 60. The rationale may derive from the general notion of
sovereign immunity, that because the sovereign can do no wrong, it cannot
authorize a wrong to be done for it. Ergo, any tort committed by an employee of
a municipality is ultra vires. See 2 F. HAnPER & F. JAMEs, TE LAw ov ToRTs

§29.3 (1956).

84 Compare MODEL Busmnss Conp. AcT § 5(a)-(b) (1979) (agent indemnifiable by business corporation if actions giving rise to liability were "in good faith,"
were undertaken in the interest of, or at least not opposed to the interest of, the
corporation, and, when a crime was involved, the agent had no reason to believe
his conduct was unlawful) with CAL. Gov'T Com § 825 (West 1980) (no authorization for public entity to indemnify "such part of a claim or judgment as is for
punitive or exemplary damages.").
8
5 See generally, Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property
Rights and Official Accountability, LAw & CONTEMPT. ThOB. 8 (Winter 1978);
Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1110 (1981).
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The point is that each of the corollary rules that we are
thereby committed to regard as given has strong implications for
the liability-immunity rules. For example, the prevalence of limited
liability among the private for-profits implies a shift toward more
liberal employment of interventionary techniques in the private
sector than we presently have.86 With regard to entities not possessing limited liability-generally, public bodies-there is the opposite
problem: the specter (perhaps more theoretical than practical) of
unacceptably far-reaching vicarious liability. When we impose a
murderously high penalty on an entity lacking limited liability,
someone may really have to pay it. Curiously, this prospect seems
to imply that we should be employing interventionist techniques
more liberally against public, as well as private, entities.8 7 Perhaps most important, if we are committed to hold constant, for our
analysis, the broader immunity of civil servants from personal liability, the implication is to raise severer threats against their principals, the public entities, than against their private counterparts.8 s
Note, however, that even when an examination of the independent variables suggests a case for employing severer measures
against one form of entity than another, we cannot conclude that
this added control should take the form of more intense penalties
(the more traditional private treatment), or of more invasive interventions (the more traditional public response). The exercise of
that choice will turn on some of the other factors discussed below.
8

6 See Stone, supra note 19, at 65-76 (advocating shift toward interventionist
techniques in response to limited liability in the private sector).
87This is not to ignore the costs entailed by interventionist techniques, which,
in principle, could exceed the costs of a given fine. See supra text accompanying
notes 76-77. But the expenses imposed by interventions are regularly incurred, and
thus become incorporated in the entity's financial statements and captured in share
prices without the same uncertainty element.
88 That is because, in the private sector, a penalty that falls on the employee
in the first instance is more likely to be passed on, ultimately, to the enterprise
because of the wider availability of employee indemnification. See supra note 84.
This is not true of public entities. For example, California public entities are, with
few exceptions, immune from liability for injury to an inpatient of a mental institution. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 854.8(a) (2) (West 1980). Public employees,
however, do not enjoy this immunity, so that if a patient suffers an injury, the
plaintiff must recover against the employee; the employer has discretionary authority, but ordinarily no duty to indemnify the employee. See VAN ALSTYNE,
supra note 61, § 4.42, at 391.
Holding the indemnification rules constant, the private enterprise will bear the
burden of liabilities (through indemnification) that will not be borne by their
public sector counterparts, except insofar as would be accounted for in compensation agreements, assuming that the public sector employees, exposed to nonindemnifiable liabilities, will demand and acquire some additional compensation for
the added risks, either ex ante, or through some ex post substitute. See generally
Stone, supra note 19, at 52-54.
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c. Differences in Managerial Incentives
How effectively money judgments that fall on the entity will
modify an organization's behavior depends on how it affects those
with -the most influence over its direction. From organization to
organization, that power is divided among managers, directors, taxpayers, budget committees, shareholders, and so on.
One can devise from these considerations several justifications
for relying upon interventions, rather than penalties, to control
the conduct of public entities. All are based on the supposition
that public sector managers are personally less intimidated than
their private counterparts by the specter of a judgment against
their employer.
One form this argument takes is not, strictly speaking, that
public sector managers derive no utility from their organization's
wealth, but that their access to it is unlimited-which results in
much the same thing. Specifically, the immunity of municipalities
from punitive damages has been rested on the view that, because
the purpose of punitive damages is to deter, and because municipalities are graced, by virtue of the taxing power, with essentially
bottomless purses, there is no purpose in penalizing them.89 This
bit of legal wisdom, which must appear to today's hard-pressed city
managers as a bad joke, would probably not warrant an appearance
in text, had the United States Supreme Court not recently resurrected it in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.90
S9 See Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975)
(disallowing punitive damages against municipality because burden would then fall
upon municipality's unlimited taxing power and because the power to elect different
municipal officers is appropriate deterrence).
00453 U.S. 247 (1981).
Because evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is traditionally admissible as a
measure of the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded, the
unlimited taxing power of a municipality may have a prejudicial impact
on the jury, in effect encouraging it to impose a sizable award. The
impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be both unpredictable and,
at times, substantial, and we are sensitive to the possible strain on local
treasuries and therefore on services available to the public at large.
Absent a compelling reason for approving such an award, not present
here, we deem it unwise to inflict the risk.
Id. 270-71 (footnotes omitted). Formally, the Court relied on legislative intent,
viz., that at the time of passage of the civil rights acts, punitive damages were
unavailable against municipalities. See id. 260.
As I indicate elsewhere, the argument for more lenient judicial treatment of
municipalities might be based more persuasively on other grounds, by appeal to
limited liability, see supra text accompanying notes 82-88, or the existence of
political alternatives, see infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
There may be a limiting case of a public agency whose output is so firmly
determined by political varieties that judgments would have no impact. For
example, imagine misconduct by the division of the Pentagon responsible for fueling
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A second form this argument takes is that the managers of
private for-profits are maximizing profit, while the managers of
government units, as of other nonprofits, are maximizing something
else, ranging from the provision of public services to the aggrandizement of their personal empires. Ergo, although money judgments appear appropriate to discipline the for-profits, they are not
well calculated to affect the nonprofits, and thus some substitution
of interventionary techniques for monetary-based techniques is indicated against the latter.
But this argument, too, is premised on generalized distinctions
between public and private that are unacceptably sweeping. The
managers of most government units-financially strapped municipalities for example-would likely be at least as chary of money
judgments as the managers of investor-owned utilities or other
business corporations that enjoy a margin of monopoly power. Indeed, even managers who pursue some nonprofit goal (managers of
a sort we will find in both sectors), must recognize that all that
empire-building, leisure creating, or whatever, also takes money.
Hence, a legal threat to the organization's wealth cannot be disregarded, whatever is being maximized. 91
What the argument requires is a somewhat moderated, and
somewhat more plausible claim: that although the personal welfare
of the managers is in almost all circumstances a function of the
organization's "wealth," 92 among the for-profits, the connection is
generally more direct. The compensation of a for-profit manager
is often tied directly to firm profits through such devices as profitsharing and stock ownership. These arrangements contribute to a
congruity of interest between the private sector manager and his
nuclear missiles.

It is barely conceivable that the government would fail to restore

whatever law-imposed penalties the division suffered. Even in that case, however,
the government might secure assurances from responsible officials that, through
improved monitoring, etc., the misconduct would not be repeated.

91 For an excellent analysis of the ordinary tort liability rules in the public
sector as a function of different models of bureaucratic behavior, see Professor M.

Spitzer's student work, Note, An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in
Tort, 50 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 515 (1977).
92

As we move from one organizational type to another, what counts as wealth

will vary. In the case of the for-profit corporation, we can speak of retained earnings; of the donative nonprofit, the endowment; of the government agency, and
of some charities, the annual budget, and so on. The differences are not as pronounced as one might be tempted to suppose. See Young, 'Nonprofits Need
Surplus, Too, 60 HAnv. Bus. REv. 124 (1982). William Niskanen suggests that,
of the several variables that enter the public sector bureaucrat's utility function,

salary and perquisites of the office are among those that are a direct function of
the total budget of the bureau. See W. A. Nis.iANE, BuRE~ucnRcy AND R-pasSENTATVE GOVERNMENT 28

(1971).
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enterprise that potentially extends beyond the period of his employment. Assuming he plans to hold his stock, he has an incentive
to. steer the organization clear even of liabilities that may not be
discovered until after his departure. There is no exactly analogous
device to tie the public sector manager to his enterprise through
time.
Managerial reputations are, of course, a factor in both sectors.
Nonetheless, monetary penalties imposed on the organization are
likely to provide more direct and effective discipline in areas in
which private characteristics dominate. In the private sector, the
market for managers may more heavily value a performer according to indices of his or her firm's financial success. 3 And a case
might be made that the mechanisms the private sector employs to
displace top-level managers (shareholder uprisings and take-over
bids) are, in general, more readily triggered by financial setbacks
than are the displacement mechanisms operating in the public
sector (by-and-large, electoral politics). 94 These factors would all
give the managers of for-profits more personal incentive to avoid
law-driven financial losses to their organization. 95 Furthermore,
even if the managerial incentives to avoid law-driven losses were
the same in both sectors, the managers of public entities, at least
where civil service rules prevail, may face more institutional resistance in carrying out the responses the law contemplates: identifying, then disciplining or firing the responsible underlings, or
changing bureaucratic rules.96
9
3 There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. One can well imagine
a university president being valued in proportion to the endowment raised, and the
manager of a charity being valued by reference to growth in. annual donations.
Conversely, it is quite possible that, in the private sector, considering the prevalence
of mixed inputs and consequences outside any individual manager's control, a
manager might be valued for having appeared to solve important production or
distribution problems, not reflected in the firm's financial statements.
94 To make a definitive judgment, one would want to know more about the
relative costs of the takeover mechanisms to the insurgents, e.g., of a proxy fight in
the private corporate sector versus an election campaign in the public. In doing
so, we would have to account for the possibility that the victors, after a successful
proxy fight, might reward themselves some of their expenses from the corporate
till. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128
N.E.2d 291 (1955) (dismissing suit challenging the reimbursement of election expenses of both new and defeated directors; in a contest over corporate policy,
reasonable expenses are reimbursable).
95 It is not self-evident how one would measure managerial sensitivity to
law-driven losses for purposes of evaluating strategies. One approach might be to
plot the elasticity of supply of company resources dedicated to legal compliance, as
a function of increments in level of expected penalty. The more sensitive organization would be the one with the higher elasticity.
06 See generally C. STONE, supra note 75, at 45-46.

1466

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1441

This analysis suggests that at least some set of public entities
(presumably those that most heavily rely on nonmarket transactions
for capital and operating funds and those subject to civil service)
are less responsive than for-profits to the prospect of money judgments. But even if we so suppose, what is implied for the choice
of strategy? By itself, an entity's relative insensitivity to wealththreats would not warrant abandoning the liability approaches.
As long as an organization's resources are of positive value to those
who steer it, there must be some level of prospective judgment
capable of daunting them into compliance. To deal with the relatively insensitive entities, we have the option to raise the expected
value of the penalty. And note that a true penalty can be raised
to whatever level deterrence requires (as opposed to a civil judgment, which is constrained by the actual damages plaintiff suffered).
The implication appears to be that higher penalties should be
employed against public than against private entities in comparable
circumstances. For example, if public units are less sensitive to
money-threats than for-profits are, ordinary compensatory tort judgments, deemed adequate to modify behavior of the latter, may be
inadequate as against the former. Hence, even in circumstances
in which we are presently satisfied to let ordinary civil judgments
"straighten out" a commercial enterprise, we might wish to deploy
against a public agency the extra "kicker" of punitive damages and
penalties-not, as present law generally has it, the other way around.
On the other hand, whatever the theory, penalties cannot be
raised indefinitely in practice. And the escalation is likely to be
constrained earlier in the case of penalties aimed at public entities.
The explanation includes the commonly-held beliefs that public
motives are more benign, 97 that electoral accountability in the
public sphere provides a satisfactory control alternative, 98 and that
the unfairness to taxpayers is more poignant than that to shareholders.9 9 Assuming that these popular attitudes are hardened
(notwithstanding, as I indicate, the difficulty of sustaining them
under analysis) then it is even less likely that the judicial system
will invoke the theoretically optimal penalty against public entities
than it will against private organizations. This constraint exacerbates the deterrence problem if public units are, overall, slightly
less sensitive to money-threats.
97

See supra text preceding note 80.

98

See infra notes 100-113 and accompanying text.

99 See infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.

1982]

CORPORATE VICES

1467

In summary, a brief survey of managerial incentives suggests
that we are justified to employ interventions against public sector
entities more freely than we do against their private counterparts,
particularly if civil servants continue to enjoy greater freedom from
personal liability and discipline.
d, Differences in Control through Electoral Accountability
Thus far I have only alluded to the fact that public units are
more directly accountable to the electorate than private units are.
It seems evident that we should be able to derive from this fact
some distinctions in the treatment of public and private bodies at
the hands of the law. But why, exactly, should the more direct
political accountability make a difference in whether we rely on
interventions or liability rules? The answer is to be found by
analyzing governments as agents.
Start this way: suppose that we hire one member of our community, Harry, to clean the streets, collar thugs, and keep an eye
on our nuclear fuel. Harry tends to all these chores personally.
His actions (and inactions) are highly visible. As Harry's principal,
we can specify his performance by contract. He being our agent,
his employment is terminable at our will. Considering this basis
of control, we would almost certainly deal with Harry's misconduct
in a different way than that of other actors, who are not as directly
our agents. With the others, we would be more inclined to use
liabilities; with Harry, we would be more inclined to use our
agency (we would call it "political") control, scoping his conduct
by contract, and removing him if he gave us cause.
We might choose to supplement our political control over
Harry by holding him liable to judgments in some circumstances.
If we made that a part of the arrangement, however, we would
have to pay Harry more to take the job. The greater his liability
exposure, the more we would have to pay him. Whether it would
be worth it to us to negotiate his assumption of various liabilities
would depend on a number of factors, including Harry's ability to
avoid the outcomes for which we intended to hold him liable, his
and our attitudes toward risk, and how strongly we feel about
compensating the injured. 10 The optimal solution is difficult to
determine. It might be ideal to hold Harry liable only for compensatory judgments; only for punitive judgments; for both; or
for neither.
100 See generally Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. Ecor. 288 (1980).
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We can specify, however, one additional feature of the situation that will make the ideal outcome somewhat more determinable.
Suppose now that Harry is in a certain sense us. Unlike the ordinary agent, who comes to his agency with some independent source
of wealth, Harry has nothing but what we provide him. Any
judgment we levy on him comes straight from our own pockets.
In these circumstances, to control Harry, we will almost certainly
rely on political mechanisms in preference to liability mechanisms.
regardless of the devices we choose for those who sweep our streets,
collar thugs, and handle nuclear fuel under the hire of other
principals.
Observe, however, that this analysis does not imply a strong
preference for political control over sovereign misconduct in all
circumstances. First, the implications are sound only insofar as
Harry's acts affect none but his principal. Our sovereign immunity
contract with Harry is of no consequence to those outside our
community who are bearing the burdens of Harry's venality or
oafishness, while we are reaping the benefits. Consider the case in
which Harry, on our behalf and in our name, dupes people across
the country to buy our worthless bonds, or attracts chemical companies to build factories on our lots by exempting them from
sewage treatment, to the detriment of those who live downstream. '10
Moreover, the more we flesh Harry into something resembling
modern government, the less confidence we can have in the effectiveness of political control. The electoral solution may be too
blunt: we may be generally satisfied with the job our servants are
doing but want them to make specific alterations in certain practices, a message that elections cannot readily transmit. And in any
event, as the population increases, efforts to monitor through the
political system confront the familiar problems of large numbers.
The monitors are ordinarily other agents, control over whom is
itself a problem. Gradually, as the government thickens with dense
layers of bureaucrats, there emerge the various problems that plague
any large bureaucracy, those that the organization literature treats
under such headings as opportunism, information impactedness,
and subgoal identification. 10 2 In the case of for-profit enterprises,
the market provides a measure of discipline that the political process
may find difficult to match.
101 See infra note 116.
102 See generally R. CRT & J. MARcH, A BEHAVIORAL Tnmony OF TnE Fnm

26-38 (1963); C. STONE, supra note 75, at 43-46; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed
Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective
Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1136-41 (1977).

CORPORATE VICES

1469

There are at least two ways to counter these tendencies. One
way is epitomized by public authorities and public corporations,
in which there has been a deliberate effort to shift some of the
burden of managerial accountability from electorate to markets.
Their hired officers, for example, are typically not, like true agents,
terminable at our will. The second, contrasting response is to try
to improve accountability through perfecting oversight and budget
procedures. This solution, too, is far from perfect. An oversight
committee may incline to award resources by reference to how
well the applicant is achieving its primary mission (dams built,
cases won), with little devaluation for the side effects, such as covering up environmental hazards, or illegal wiretaps and mail covers.
The designated committee may well regard these foibles as the
principal concern of someone else.
Because monitoring and controlling by the political process
thus have their own limitations, at some point it makes sense to
shift toward judicially imposed liabilities, even for deterring one's
own sovereign. Let me illustrate with what appears on the surface
to be an almost paradoxical application of sovereign liability: a
situation in which one branch of a sovereign criminally prosecutes
another. For example, the Department of Justice might bring a
criminal civil rights violation against the Public Health Service
based on PHS's syphilis experiments on southern black males. 10 3
From one perspective, such a suit seems to be a meaningless exercise
in federal bookkeeping, particularly if we disregard the possibility
of remedies other than a fine. 10 4 Should the prosecution "win,"
someone in the Treasury would write the Treasury a check.
And yet, even acknowledging the juggling of accounts involved,
such a proceeding would not be an empty gesture. For the society
at large, the suit would serve one of the principal functions of the
criminal law-to denounce, formally and ceremoniously, what is
deemed unacceptable conduct. With regard to the responsible
officials, the stamp of an indictment against their bureau 105 is "bad
03

1

See supra note 80.

But cf. Defense Supplies Corp. v. United States Lines

Co., 148 F.2d 311 (2d Cir.) (civil suit by one federally-owned corporation held an
action by the United States against the United States, and not contemplated by

admiralty statute), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945).
10 4 Criminal prosecutions can, however, result in a remedy other than a fine.
For example, probation could be employed to fashion structural relief, as in
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972), discussed
supra note 63.
105 Note that a bureau, unlike a federal corporation or a public authority,
ordinarily enjoys no legal existence independent of government, and thus is not
ordinarily suable in its own name. Agencies may be sued in their own name, and
indeed, there is eminent support for the proposition that "suability rather than
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press"-a sanction in itself. By underscoring the seriousness of the
conduct, the suit would make the managers' appearances before
their oversight committee that much less pleasant. Even if the fine
does not come out of the bureau's resources, which is problematical,
budgetary approval might at least be conditioned upon the bureau's
adopting more appropriate internal controls for the future. These
and similar benefits of the prosecution may be worth the costs of
staging it, depending on the circumstances. 1 6
Let us shift focus to punitive damages, which presents the more
frequently litigated problem. Does it make sense to empower one
of the sovereign's own subjects to recover a judgment in excess of
his actual damages? In such a situation, a private plaintiff's victory
is no mere account-juggling, for it represents an actual cost, a transfer of the community's funds to one of its members. 1' 7 On the
other hand, there are advantages that may be worth paying for.
Empowering private citizens to sue not only shifts some of the administrative and litigation costs, it provides a liability-driving
mechanism not as subject as the local prosecutor's office to political
influence. This feature could be particularly significant when, in
the nature of the complaint, government officers, possibly allied
with the prosecutors, will be put on the defensive.
It is a matter of concern that the prospect of liability may
induce excess caution. This prospect is ordinarily raised in support of civil servant immunity, most recently, and dramatically, in
connection with the United States presidency. 08 If a government
employee in the exercise of his discretion has to mull the prospects
of a penalty for a "bad call," unbalanced by the prospect of a compensating bonus for a "good one," he may incline to be too conimmunity should be the assumption when a federal agency, rather than the United
States itself, is the defendant." H. HART & H. WEcsraRa, THz FEDERAL COURTS
1351 (2d ed. 1973). The treatment is, in all events, uneven,
AND FEDERAL SYSE

and to bring about the result discussed in text would take some amendment of
present law.
106For example, when wrongdoing is criminalized, the FBI and grand juries
may be available to assist in the preparation of the case, whereas they otherwise

would not be.

107The community will recoup some of its funds when the punitive damages

are taxable.

See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955)

(punitive damages for fraud and antitrust violations are taxable); Rev. Rul. 75-230,
1975-1 C.B. 93 (exemplary, but not compensatory damages for defamations tax-

able); Treas. Reg. §1.61-14(a) (1965).

But see Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B.

47 (all damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received for personal injury

or sickness excludable from income).

108 The most recent reaffirmation is Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982)

(public's own interest in official's "bold and unhesitating action" might be

jeopardized by prospect of civil liability of United States President).
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servative. But the same consideration supports providing an entire
agency with immunity for discretionary acts. For example, the
Food and Drug Administration can anticipate various sanctions 10 9
for allowing a harmful drug like thalidomide to enter the market.
But for the timely marketing of a beneficial drug, the agency cannot count on positive rewards, such as the market holds out for
the pharmaceutical firm. As a consequence, the incentives operating on agencies today may already be skewed toward overdeterrence; more people may be dying from delayed access to "good"
drugs than die from exposure to "bad" ones.11 From this perspective, one could argue that to add the prospect of a liability judgment that the agency might have to absorb in its own budget would
only make matters worse.
On the other hand, the risk of overdeterrence-the inducement
to exercise undue caution-is endemic to the controlling of misconduct generally, whether the target is public or private, and
whether the strategy involves liabilities or interventions." 1 Obviously, when penalties are leveled against actors principally subject
to market forces (which is as true of the Port of Los Angeles
Authority as it is of the Chrysler Corporation) the tendency to engage in excess caution is tempered by countervailing rewards for
beneficial performance. When dealing with organizations not as
directly subject to market rewards, the better solution, although by
no means a simple one, may be to design some equivalent mechanisms for providing positive incentives, before we resign ourselves
to inadequate deterrence.
In sum, my point is not that political control is an illusory
foundation for sovereign immunity. When the degree of political
accountability is or could be made high, monitor and control costs
considered, political control may provide a superior alternative to
liability control. In many other situations, electoral control is inadequate: for example, when we are dealing with public institutions that are by design buffered from political winds 1 2 or when
109 Sanctions would include bad publicity, which may make it more difficult
for the agency to recruit and retain personnel, and even impede enforcement
efforts as a consequence of lost credibility; those effects will make the work
atmosphere less satisfying, even demoralizing, for those who stay on.
The Benefits and Costs of New Drug Regulation, in
lo See PLTzmA,
REGULTING Nzw Daucs 113 (R. L. Landau ed. 1973).
111 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 & n.17
(1978) (Supreme Court reluctant to interpret statute as authorizing strict criminal
liability in order to avoid deterring salutary conduct).
11 See A. H. WAisH, supra note 12, at 11.

On the other hand, no public

agency can be wholly buffered from shifts in political climate, as evidenced by the

J
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the people who need protection have no voice over the sovereign
whose actions threaten them. 113 In still another important class of
cases, increased use of liability judgments may serve as a valuable
supplement to political mechanisms by oiling, even firing up, the
electoral accountability process.
e. Differences in the Distributional Consequences
The choice of strategy is also determined by our desire that the
brunt of our action fall on the right people in the right way.
Sovereign immunity, for example, has been defended on the grounds
that to impose a heavy judgment on a municipality will be either
to make "innocent" taxpayers suffer," 4 or else to restrict "vital
services," 115 thereby concentrating the loss on a blameless subgroup
of users. Even when such distributional considerations have not
salvaged immunity as such, they often seem to temper judicial attitudes, so that in fixing judgment levels, courts may be more lenient
with municipalities than with business corporations, even for offenses of essentially the same character." 6 Such are among the
various reasons that, for example, the Environmental Protection
Agency has had less success cajoling municipal corporations into
compliance with water pollution standards than it has the forprofits." 7
On close examination, it is not easy to justify these discrepant
sympathies. Certainly if a municipality is penalized for the misconduct of its police officers, the consequence, for all we know
recent history both of the Legal Services Corporation and the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting.
113 See supra text accompanying note 101.
114 See supra notes 89-90. The "innocent taxpayers" argument is also put
forward in Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, CALIsoRNI. LAw
RvISION CoMMssIoN, REPoRTs 801, 817 (1963).
115 See supra note 90.
116 In the wake of the spilling of the highly toxic substance Kepone into the
James River, the private firms charged, Allied Chemical Corporation and Life
Sciences Corporation, were fined $13.2 million and $3.8 million, respectively; by
contrast, the host city of Hopewell was fined only $10,000, even though it had
good reason to be aware that toxic spills were taking place, and was benefiting
from being an attractive home site for chemical companies. (It advertised itself
as the "Chemical capital of the South.") See generally Stone, A Slap on the
Wrist for The Kepone Mob, 22 Bus. & Soc'y REv. 4, 8-9 (Summer 1977), Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case Study, 8 INsr'L L 645, 656 (1978) ("Given the expenses of
modem urban life, juries will not convict municipalities and judges will be lenient
on sentencing them.").
7
1
See Miller, Waste Woes: Municipalities Trail Industry in Cleanup of Water
Pollution, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (reporting 1976 estimate by
Environmental Protection Agency that 90 per cent of industrial polluters were
moving into compliance, but only 50 per cent of cities and towns).
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about the city's internal politics, might be a reduction in the public
library's budget, thereby concentrating the loss on the library's
staff and book-borrowers. But it is also true that when a -large
corporation is fined for the price-fixing of its paper carton division,
the penalty may be paid at the cost of an expansion in baby foods.
Nor is the proclaimed innocence of the taxpayers so persuasive
a basis for distinction." 8 If a municipality has been systematically
underpolicing sewage treatment as part of a program to attract
chemical companies and thereby fatten its employment and tax
base, the taxpayers are the beneficiaries of their agents' wrongs,
just as the shareholders are of theirs.
In fact, just about everything that could be said on behalf of
the purportedly "innocent" taxpayers of a fair-sized city could be
said, with equal cogency, in favor of the shareholders in a fair-sized
company.:"
The fact is, vicarious liability is always hard cheese
on someone (so is suffering the effects of toxic waste), but it is not
therefore without warrant in the law. All we can say is, there
comes a point at which a group's knowledge about, and control
over, the actual wrongful conduct becomes so attenuated that it is
practically pointless and morally wrong to hold them culpable as
principals. But where this point lies is a function of numbers, of
monitor and control costs, and many other factors that poorly correlate, even in a general way, with the characteristics that make a
corporation public or private.
Finally, even if someone succeeds in devising a reason for according more sympathy, in general, to taxpayers than to shareholders (or to beneficiaries of foundations, who also suffer for the
wrongful acts of their agents), it would still not settle the question
of our principal concern: what substitution in strategies is indi118 Note that the standards for respondeat superior will ordinarily protect the

principal from consequences of agent misconduct from which the principal stood
no chance of benefit.
119Not only could it be said, it has been-in two major decisions by our
Symposium's introductory speaker, Judge Friendly. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring) (consequences
of holding corporation negligent for drafting a press release on which investors
relied, to their detriment, "are frightening" if civil liability were to ensue; result
would "lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors
...."); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967)
(punitive damages against pharmaceutical company for producing drug that caused
cataract and other disabilities denied; Judge Friendly, observing that the possibilities of multiple punitive awards in suits brought on behalf of hundreds of
plaintiffs are "staggering," stated, "a sufficiently egregious error as to one product
can end the business life. of a concern that has wrought much good in the past and
might otherwise have continued to do so in the future, with many innocent stockholders suffering extinction of their investments for a single management sin.").
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cated? Specifically, interventions, not only penalties, compel expenditure of an organization's resources in a way generally inimicable to its citizens, shareholders, or beneficiaries. There is no
basis for concluding, in any sweeping, general way, whether penalties or interventions will impose the unfairest burden.
f. Differences in Constitutional Ramifications
Thus far, I have supposed the selection of strategies to be
dominated by considerations of deterrence, within some loosely
indicated fairness and efficiency constraints. But some disparity in
treatment might be based on constitutional considerations, whose
values, including separation of powers and pluralism, raise special
pleas for intragovernmental and intergovernmental immunities. In
any given case, those values can conflict with, and override, what
appears to be the most efficient, distributionally acceptable
deterrent.
To start with, some alternatives desirable as a matter of deterrence may be foreclosed constitutionally. The eleventh amendment
bars federal courts from meting out damage awards against states,
at least at the instance of another state's citizens, barring consent. 20
In other situations, the same underlying values may appear in nonconstitutional guise, influencing statutory construction. For example, in Parker v. Brown,121 the Court was likely influenced by
intergovernmental immunity values in ruling that Congress did not
intend to apply the Sherman Act against a state. 122
Related considerations, derived from norms of good government, support sovereign immunity for discretionary acts. When
the political branches weigh the social costs and benefits of proposed
government action, they may be presumed to take into account the
risks they are leaving uncovered and the costs of the alternatives
that might avoid them. On this view, one can maintain that only
the clearest mandate for judicial power would make it appropriate
for the courts to second guess the other branches' balancing; the
discretionary decision becomes, in effect, a "political question."
120 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890) even suggests, in dictum never
disavowed, that a federal court might be barred from entertaining suit by a citizen
against his own nonconsenting state. See Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability
for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. flv. 1, 29-32 (1972).
121 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
22
3
See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (eleventh amendment bars
retroactive award against state agency under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because section 1983

did not abrogate the state's eleventh amendment immunity). There are also
complex questions of the power of one government to tax the instrumentalities of
another. See generally, ABEL, The Public Corporation in the United States, in
THE PUBLic ConpoRAnoN 338-73 (W. Friedmann ed. 1954).
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There is some appeal in this analysis. It has been well stated
by Professor (presently Assistant Attorney General) Baxter 123 and
my commentator, Professor Goodman, is understandably attracted
to it.124 Nonetheless, I think that the argument involves us in a
regress common to many arguments that require reconstructing
what was "taken into account" in some prior deliberation. It
would be just as plausible for a court to assume that the other
branches, when making their decisions, anticipated that the judiciary, with the benefit of judicial process and hindsight, would
correct misjudgments, compensate the injured, and even rebuke
and reform should that be appropriate.
At the least, the ambiguity reminds us that once we raise the
constitutional and constitutional-like issues, we open a large and
treacherous terrain, most of which I will gladly avoid. There is,
however, one area too germane to the present inquiry to ignore.
Consider some state or local government conduct that is either
clearly subject to federal control or at least at the margin of being
so, such that the legitimacy of federal influence presents a close
constitutional question.las Our analysis squarely raises the question,
is it constitutionally more acceptable for the federal government
to exercise control over a state or local unit via a monetized judgment, 126 or via an interventionist route such as an autonomydisplacing statute or its judicial equivalent, a structural relief
injunction?
It is a difficult question. In some circumstances, the answer
may depend on the basis of the action, or the character of the
remedy that the wrong requires. For example, in the case of a
student disciplinary action or employee discharge, the cause of
action itself may be grounded in a constitutional claim; and what
the law may require is some bureaucratic procedure: a hearing,
or an ombudsman. 27
The law could, of course, leave it to the
123 See Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Private 42 LAw & CONTFMP.
PROBS. 45, 49-51 (Winter 1978) ("discretionary acts" exception to governmental

liability under Federal Torts Claims Act waiver traceable to the policy that courts
are institutionally unsuited to second guess policy decisions of other branches).
124 See transcript of Professor Frank Goodman's speech given at the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review's Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, January 23, 1982 (on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
125 One might imagine, for example, Congress expressly subjecting all state
activity to the federal antitrust laws, and providing for federally appointed masters
to take over local antitrust compliance in cases of recidivism.
126 Of course, there are special problems when the arrangement vests in a
citizen the power to sue the state, see supra note 120, inasmuch as this raises the
problems of the eleventh amendment and constructive waiver..
127 Even an ombudsman appointed in aid of a court, ostensibly to aid in
gathering information related to substantive charges can, in the course of interview-
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organization to develop a response in the first instance, threatening
the government or its officials with a fine, or empowering the injured to sue for punitive damages should the organization fail to
reform itself fairly. But in these circumstances, we have to account
for the vagueness of fairness, the difficulties of measuring damages,
and, as I shall argue, the whole public's interest (not merely the
plaintiff's) that the institution possess the correct organizational
character. It may be more appropriate to spell out exactly what is
required of the organization, enjoining it to reform itself, 28 than to
require payment of punitive damages to those who are directly
aggrieved. That discussion, however, can be deferred both because
in the region of our present concern the plaintiff's action is not
constitutionally grounded (it is the defense that may be) and the aim
of the law, typically, is only that the actor achieve some measurable
output, for the attainment of which any internal procedure the
organization adopts is equally acceptable, and for the nonattainment
of which the law's penalties can be independently attached.12
Take pollution control as an example. Ordinarily it is the
level of emission that the law seeks to regulate. 30 The emission
is an output, an end accomplished by any number of means which,
so far as the law is concerned, are equally acceptable. In these circumstances we have a choice of strategy: either interventions, mandating some means by which the pollution is to be abated, or
monetized judgments, attaching penalties for failure to achieve the
required output. Assuming that the two approaches could be
fashioned equivalently to suit the ordinary constraints on enforceing inmates, improve the institution's fairness, effectiveness and legitimacy.

See

Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 841 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
2 8

1

See infra text accompanying notes 229-33.

129

For example, if we want a corporation to stop polluting there is in prin-

ciple no reason we cannot attach a penalty to a coal-fired plant emitting, for
instance, over one pound of sulfur dioxide per million BTUs produced. But if
what we want is fairness, attaching penalties is more complicated, and less satis-

factory. We could in theory call fairness a sort of output, demanding that the
organization's managers achieve a satisfactory solution-the correct output of
fairness-at the peril of a penalty for noncompliance. Among other problems,
however, is that attaching penalties to vague standards runs into moral, even

constitutional, constraints.
13o That is, the predominant approach to air pollution under the Clean Air
Act is to require existing plants to reduce their sulphur dioxide discharges per

million BTUs produced, in varying amounts, depending upon the airshed. See
Ackerman and Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89
YALE L.J. 1466, 1477 (1980).

Note, however, that technology-in the case of

coal burning plants, scrubbers-may be compelled for new plants, an approach
that is, in the terminology of this article, a substitution of an interventionist for a
penalty strategy.

See id. (generally critical of the scrubber requirements).
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ment costs, fairness, and so on, our question concerns which one
is preferable in terms of constitutional values.
To illustrate, let us take as given the federal government's
power to constrict a municipality's air or water effluent. There is
nothing inherent in the requirement of remedy that forecloses either
the intervention or the monetized penalty. The federal government could tell the state or local unit how to go about its job; laying down an overall plan specifying which technology had to be
adopted, what administrative structure was necessary to oversee
pollution abatement, what reforms of local rules (such as driving
131
speeds and hours of industrial operation) were needed, and so on.

The alternative, penalty approach, would be to establish an acceptable rate of emission-X units of pollutant emitted per hour, or
per ton of fuel consumed-backed by a penalty for noncompliance,
either per diem, or proportionate to the deviation.
In the abstract, it is difficult to say which approach is more
offensive to the integrity of local government or the values of community. Much obviously depends on the level of penalty contemplated: the power to fine, like the power to tax, can be the power
to destroy. But if we restrict the fine's wound to less than mortal
magnitude, and compare it with an intervention entailing roughly
comparable costs, there is much to be said for preferring the fine.
First, the burden the fine imposes is more visible to the polity. We
can see exactly how much one government is demanding of the
other, which is a good foundation for debating the demands' legitimacy. Second, the penalty leaves the local government free not to
comply-at a price. If the penalty is reasonably related to the
benefits, a decision by the local government to buy its way out
should be respected-on many matters, at least-as a statement of
its priorities even accounting for the interests the dominant sovereign represents. A defect of interventions (common to injunctions generally) is that they foreclose this accounting.132
(refusing to review lower court
'31 See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S., 100 (1976)
judgment invalidating transportation control plan promulgated by EPA under Clean
Air Act on grounds that the federal parties renounced their intent to seek review
of certain invalidated regulations and conceded need to modify others)., The
judicial counterpart would be the imposition, by injunction, of a court-ordered
plan, or evel. quasi-receivership, over the local government's air or water management program.
132 Cf. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines

as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cmr. L. REv. 681, 706-08 (1973)

(favoring penalties

over injunctions in the area of land use controls on the ground that monetized
judgments retain market-sensitivity). There is, of course, social conduct that we
may be less readily inclined to allow an actor to engage in in exchange for paying
damages or even a fine. An example would be illegal racial discrimination, accounted for in Region II.
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Third, if an intervention is selected and the local unit is recalcitrant, we may be committed to a physical solution, even calling
in federal officers to implement the plan themselves. By contrast,
if the local unit does not pay its fine, there are less confrontational
alternatives. Quite likely, some of the federal funds on which local
governments are dependent could be withheld, without offending

133
National League of Cities v. Usery.
Fourth, if the local government does choose to comply with
the mandated output standard, it is free to devise what it considers
the most acceptable means of achieving the target, as determined
by its own political processes, and according to its own political
preferences. True, the output-penalty approach displaces the, local
government on a matter of substance: the target must be achieved.
But if the aim is to protect the state and local governments from
atrophy, and to preserve the values of community, the interventionist techniques, in displacing the political processes of the state or
local government, strike me as the more intrusive and invidious
threat, for they wither the very muscles on which democratic exer-

cise depends. 3 4

As a conclusion for the constitutional considerations, we might
urge the law to rotate from its present orientation. Presently,
there is some evidence that injunctions are favored over money
judgments when government units are before the bar,13 5 and courts
appear to fashion interventionist remedies more freely against
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
There is an interesting parallel in the reluctance of the courts to affect the
internal workings of religious organizations, even though they may impose punitive
damages on them. See People v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., 127 Cal. App.
3d 547, 178 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1982) (dissolving provisional receivership imposed by
lower court at attorney-general's behest in wake of allegations of financial misappropriation by church leaders. The receivership was said to conflict "with the
constitutional prohibition against the governmental establishment or interference
with the free exercise of religion. How the State . . . can control church property
and the receipt and expenditure of church funds without necessarily becoming involved in the ecclesiastical functions of the church is dificult to conceive.") 127
Cal. App. 3d at 551, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 915; see Allard v. Church of Scientology of
California, 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091
(1976) (punitive damage judgment of $50,000 awarded against religious corporation for malicious prosecution of former member).
135 See, e.g., Employees v. Dep't. of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973) (acknowledging congressional power to abrogate state immunity from
citizens suit in federal court, but declining to construe Fair Labor Standards Act
as having done so); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (similarly, refusing
to find waiver). But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (finding clear
evidence of congressional intent to make Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 applicable to states in displacement of eleventh amendment claims, and holding such action valid under the fourteenth amendment). See generally L. TRmE,
'33

134

AmmucAN CONSTmu1oNAL LAW 130-43 (1978).
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government units than against for-profit corporations.0 3 6 At least
as far as the federalist/pluralist considerations are concerned-considerations which, admittedly, inform only a part of the decisionthe attitude should be the opposite.
III. THE REGION OF PUBLIC LIABILITIES/PRIVATE IMMUNITIES

In Region I, as we have seen, a defendant's public character
may serve to ensconce it beyond the court's reach. But as I indicated at the ouset, there is another region in which the tables are
roughly turned. In the first region, counsel for a hybrid-the
government contractor, the licensee, the recipient of government
dole-will emphasize the public character of its personality. In
the second region, it does better to be characterized as private.
The two regions are not as much the mirror images that my

subtitles, with their liabilities-immunities polarity, may suggest.
An organization that is private in the first region, in the sense of
being liable to an ordinary tort suit, is not necessarily private in
the second. For example, a Region I private entity is not necessarily free, under Region II, from the fourteenth amendment's
obligation not to discriminate racially.137 Moreover, in the first
136 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. Cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (President unauthorized to direct
Secretary of Commerce to assume management of most of nation's steel mills in
order to avert strike which was likely to hamper Korean War efforts). The validity
of the statement in the text diminishes, the more we construe traditional judicial
actions such as corporate reorganizations to be tokens of interventionist judicial
activity in the private sector. See Eisenberg and Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HA3v. L. REv. 465 (1980), which
correctly emphasizes the long tradition of judicial oversight and visitation; but
almost always, these interventions have the strong support of dominant corporate
constituencies and do not conflict with the organization's traditional goals, such as
maximizing profits and preserving assets. My suggestion, however, that courts
intervene in the interests of, say, preserving the environment at some sacrifice of
profits, has not the same tradition, and raises much more serious problems of
successful implementation. See Stone, Law and the Culture of the Corporationj
15 Bus. & Soc'y REv. 5 (Fall 1975).
The more frequent (perhaps more dramatic) structural. relief in the public
sector owes to the clash of constitutional principles, to doubts about the efficacy
of monetized penalties applied to governments, and perhaps to the view that what
the law requires in the public sector cases is more often a process than an output
to which a penalty can be readily attached.
137 Consider, for example, the private restaurant operating in premises leased
from a public parking authority, held subject to fourteenth amendment obligations
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 212-17). Suppose the day after that decicion, Burton,
enjoying his newly won right to eat on the premises, slipped and fell, and sued
the restaurant in tort. I assume that the restaurant could not simply cite Burton
as authority that it is public, and thus entitled to sovereign immunity.
The converse-an organization public for Region I (enjoying sovereign immunity) but private for Region II (not obliged to bear fairness obligations) is harder
to find. The general rule is that a private actor- that contracts with a public body
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region, the rationale that supports immunity of public bodies from
liability suits does not imply that they also should be immune from
other devices of government. - On the contrary, the arguments for
restricting the exposure of public entities to liability judgments
appears strongest when there exist viable political (nonjudicial)
alternatives. 138 In the present region, however, the reasons for
granting private actors immunity from judicial control are also
reasons for placing the actor beyond the reach of legislative and
executive action.
I . Hence, in the first region, in which the conduct we are trying
to deter, such as jeopardizing life and limb, is not to be tolerated
in any actor be it public or private, the law operates to strike a
balance between judicial control and legislative or executive control. In the present region, in which the disfavored conduct-being
arbitrary, unevenhanded, discriminatory, inconsiderate-is of a sort
that may be tolerated among some actors, there is a more fundamental and starker alternative: between public control over the
conduct, on the one hand, and no legal control, only moral dissuasion, on the other.
What has produced these two regions, with these rough differences they entail? One is tempted to appeal, at least for a formal
explanation, to the fact that we are passing from the realm of the
common law and ordinary legislation to the realm of the federal
Constitution, much of which pivots on state action. But while the
Constitution, through state action, is the dominant source for this
region, the constitutional cases alone do not present the full impact
that public/private thinking has had on the law.
A. The Nonconstitutional Sources of the Second Region
To start with, the Constitution is not the sole source of fairness
obligations even for government organizations clearly subject to
for performance of public work shares the public body's immunity, unless guilty of
negligent or willful tort. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382, 389-90 (1966). The
question here, though, is whether there are circumstances

in which a private

contractor, entitled to tort immunity, would be safe from fairness obligations.
Taking first nonconstitutional fairness, it appears possible that a government contractor enjoying tort immunity might- not enjoy immunity from the National Labor
Relations Act; the standards are not coextensive. Compare Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382,
supra with Annot., 54 A.L.R. FFD. 619 (1981). As for state action, see Dobyns v.
E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1982) (for purposes of claims of former
employees that their constitutional rights were violated by unauthorized searches
and by discharges, company which was responsible for providing necessary personnel, materials, transportation, and various services required to support United
States Sinai Field Mission, and whose employees were immunized from all local
criminal, civil, tax, and custom laws was engaged in state action).
138 See supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
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its commands. Witness, for example, the Administrative Procedure
Act, 8 9 or the fact that long before the Constitution was enacted
the law was imposing obligations on inns, common carriers, and
other various occupations "affected with the public interest" not to
discriminate, to be reasonable, and so on.140 And along with the
development of constitutional doctrine, there evolved a nonconstitutional body of law subjecting private corporations and .associations'to much the same sort (if not the same breadth and intensity)
of fairness constraints that are imposed on governments by the
Constitution.
Consider, for example, how the securities and corporations
laws, including- the common law based fiduciary duties, import
fairness into the business corporation's dealings with its investors;
how the labor laws do the same in regard to dealings with workers;
and how the consumer laws affect dealings with consumers.' 4 ' In
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 42 the antitrust laws became
the unlikely instrument for "constitutionalizing" the stock exchange, a private government. Moreover, in both common law
and statute there are growing inroads into the private employer's
freedom to terminate a worker vindictively, arbitrarily, or discriminatorily.143

In fact, some of the Dealer's Day In Court Acts, which

govern the relations between an automobile manufacturer and its
189 15 U.S.C. §§ 559-704 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (reversing conviction on basis of federal prosecutor's
improper conduct, but not on express constitutional grounds):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.
Id. 88.
14D See supranote 23..
14 1 Consider, for example, the advent of "procedural unconscionability" in
commercial law. See generally Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977) (generally opposing invalidating contracts on basis of nonsubstantive unconscionability except in cases of certain market

information failures).
142 373 U.S. 341 (1963).

143 See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (tort action available for employee fired for refusal to participate in illegal price-fixing scheme); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373
Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (terminating employee in order to eliminate his
claim for commissions violated covenant of "good faith and fair dealing"); Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (action available against
employer for wrongful discharge if motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employee cannot be
discharged for refusing to follow employer's instructions not to volunteer for .more
than short-term jury duty; discharge wrongful if "for socially undesirable reason")-.
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dealers, are striking examples of due process considerations being
transported into private environments by statute. 44
In the area of private colleges and universities, even when
courts have not found a state action nexus adequate to impose due
process constraints as such, they have imposed many of the same
obligations through judicial' interpretation of tuition and employment contracts. 4 The courts leave the impression that, in determining what is reasonable and expected in the private college sector,
they are drawing upon the public institution as a model, thereby
bringing public and private more closely together. Similarly, as
private membership associations have gained power, their traditional
immunity from court review has been eroding. 14 And there is the
ubiquitous government contract to be accounted for: private actors
who accept federal monies often consent to terms that restrict their
liberty to discriminate.

47

Thus, in this region, as in the first, if we survey the entire legal
landscape we find throughout it the same response to the increasing
hybridization: a narrowing of the gap between public and private.
144 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 20020 (West 1982) (termination prior
to franchise expiration for good cause only); id. § 20025 (written notice by franchiser required as prerequisite to franchise termination); 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976)
("good faith" required in automobile dealer franchise relations).
145 See Jennings, Breach of Contract Suits by Students Against Postsecondary
Educaton Institutions: Can They Succeed?, 7 J.C. & U.L. 191, 198-202 (1981)
(discussion of cases awarding due-process-like rights to private college students);
Ray, Toward Contractual Rights for College Students, 10 J.L. & EDUc. 163 (1981)
(same); Note, The Importance of Being Private: Judicial Intervention into Dismissal Policies of Private Colleges and Universities, 35 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1027
(1978) (same); see also O'Brien, Due Process for the Nontenured in Private
Schools, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 175, 188 (1974) (indicating that most private, as well as
public, schools provide notice and hearing to tenured teachers in dismissal cases;
author deriving right to same from "natural law").
146 See Developments in the Law-judicial Control of Actions of Private
Associations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983 (1963).
147As early as 1951, fair employment practices were made mandatory for defense contractors, see Exec. Order No. 10210, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1951), apparently a
practice that had origins in World War II policies, see N. DonsEN, P. BENDER, B.
NEUBORNE, & S. LAW, 2 POLITrCAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 994
(4th ed. 1979). Subsequent executive orders have prohibited discrimination on
the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, and age not based on a bonafide
occupational qualification; generally, the nondiscrimination requirements apply to
all government contracts involving more than $10,000. Id. 995.
In regard to the tendency to "level" the differences among organizations, at
least between public institutions and the nonprofits, consider also that in 1978 the
Internal Revenue Service proposed guidelines to end the tax exempt status of
private schools which had either been adjudicated racially discriminatory or which
had rapidly expanded in the wake of desegregation orders. See 43 Fed. Reg.
37,296 (1978); Wilson, An Overview of the IRS's Revised Proposed Revenue
Procedure on Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organizations, 57 TAXEs 515 (1979).
The proposed regulations were subsequently withdrawn.
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Private bodies of all sorts-business organizations,. membership
associations, charities-are being increasingly subjected to the obligations once largely associated with the hard core public, sector.
B. The State Action Sources of the Second Region
Despite this gradual convergence in the treatment accorded
"public" and "private" entities, in this region, as in the first, distinctions remain.1 48 Because the law in this area draws from nonconstitutional as well as constitutional sources, an analysis of the
state action doctrine cannot provide a full account: Nevertheless,
state action is the dominant factor to consider: first, because if the
courts find state action, some constitutional standards of conduct
become obligatory irrespective of the common law or of legislative
or executive authorization; second, when state action exists, the
courts, having a constitutional basis for their review, are likely to
exercise more active scrutiny; 149 and third, much of the nonconstitutional activity can be construed as mimicking the constitutional
developments, often, one supposes, with an eye to forestalling the
extension of state action per se.
But it is easier to say that the influence of state action has
been dominant than to define it. No one has come up with any
unifying theory to reconcile, much less to justify, the outcomes of
all the cases. And I scarcely suggest that by concentrating on our
Many of the apparent disparities in treat-14 The gap is difficult to measure.
ment accorded public and private entities probably stem less from a judgment that
different obligations are appropriate depending on different -organizational characteristics, than from differences in the services that are being provided, or in the
groups that are being affected. For example, prisons have been one of the most
active areas for judicially-imposed fairness obligations. But there being no private
prisons, we have no exact public/private comparison to examine, and can raise only
hypothetically the question whether less would be demanded of the one type of
institution than of the other. Furthermore, there are often between sectors no
exact counterparts to the protected interest or group. Private associations have
members, private charities have donors and beneficiaries, and the business corporations have investors. The public constituency is analogous to none of these
situations. Differences in treatment that appear on the surface to be because of
public or private organizational characteristics may actually, therefore, derive from
differences of other sorts.
149 For example, although the common law has provided some review for employees fired in the private sector, see supra the cases cited in note 143, they certainly lack the degree of protection required in the public sector by Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Owens v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980).
One can imagine a legislative mandate saddling a public organization with
more obligations than the courts, acting solely on the Constitution, would impose.
For example, although the courts have been hesitant to make military forts "public
forums" for purposes of political campaigning, see Greer v, Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976), Congress, presumably, could authorize them to do so.

1484

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1441

one thread only the actor's public and private organizational characteristics, -we-will put-it all in focus. Certainly the related considerations of.public and private activities exercise independent
force. And everyone suspects, although judges rarely say,150 that
what is "public" -expands and contracts depending upon the substance .of the, plaintiff's claim. Yet, recent decisions confirm my
emphasis by treating the actor's public/private characteristics not
only as independently significant, but even as the dominant element
of judicial interest. In Polk County v. Dodson,151 a private attorney
serving in a public defender capacity was found not to be a state
actor although she was appointed and paid by the state, her service
was in support of a. uniquely public function (the criminal process),
and the right involved,, that to a fair trial, is certainly considered
fundamental. More striking, 52 in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 5 3 the
Court refused to extend state action standards to a "private" school
whose business consisted almost entirely of teaching maladjusted
high school students under state contract; this, despite the facts that
the activity being -performed was primarily and traditionally a
public function, and that the underlying liberty, that of a discharged school employee to her first amendment rights, sounded as
calculated to overshadow fine distinctions in public/private organizational characteristics, as any. Moreover, in Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co., 5 4 the most recent word on attachment, 155 the Court, in
finding state action, made it clear that attribution to the state depends upon finding a state actor involved at the level of the depriving conduct; the case cannot rest on a showing that the conduct
was the exercise (by anyone) of a state-created right or privilege. 5 6
150 In a sex discrimination case against the Little League, girl plaintiffs failed
to get to first base by taking a poke at the League's federal charter. See King v.
Little League Baseball, Inc., 505 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1974). But the trial judge

noted that, had the complaint been by Negro boys alleging racial discrimination,
he would have found state action "more readily."

Id. 266.

The appellate court,

however, expressly disaffiliated itself from the trial judge's reasoning. Id. 267.
151 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
152 It did so, I shall maintain, quite erroneously. See infra text accompanying
notes 238-42.
153 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982)..
154 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).

155 See infra text accompanying notes 162-64.
156The whole state action area appears now, more than ever, a shambles.
This confusion will strengthen the support, long abounding, to eliminate state action
as an independent analysis entirely. Under such a view, all actions, by all actors,

are subject to constitutional review for their impact on, for example, speech; the
extent to which government is involved in the challenged conduct can be regarded
as simply one of many factors to be somehow considered in determining whether
the Constitution has been violated.
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C. The "'State Action" Implicationsfor Public and Private
OrganizationalCharacteristics
Thus, to examine the actor's public/private org-niiational
characteristics is to concentrate only on one element of a state
action inquiry, albeit an element that the Supreme Court appears
increasingly disposed to consider. Granted, concentrating on the
actor's organizational characteristics distracts from the other elements that deserve judicial attention, such as the character of the
right that is in issue. But there is a redeeming virtue, that the
organizational'characteristics provide a focus that is in several respects more manageable than if we were to take head on the entire
army of state action issues.
First, in many, perhaps most, of the state action cases, there is
no question that the actor whose conduct is challenged is private,
at least in terms of its organizational characteristics: its formal-legal
status, the accountability orientation of its management, and the
dominant source of its funding.157 The case for state action is
typically rested on allegations either that the actor, although generically private, was performing a public function (the company
town, 158 or the shopping center that invites public entry '19)or that,
in order to carry out the complained-of actions the private body
acted in concert with the state's agents (the luncheon counter that
invokes the sheriff to eject Negro trespassers 160). By contrast, our
I do not receive this view unsympathetically. But state action cannot be dismissed merely because a single unifying theory lies beyond our grasp, and because
whatever policies it acts in motion are neither clear nor dispositive. That seems
truer of principles, the more they are basic. And state action operates on so many
basic choices it is practically inherent in our concept of law. See Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982) (quoted supra note 7).
On this view, to retain state action as an independent inquiry is, more than
anything else, a commitment to work within a broad and basic framework, without
expectation of a sharp sense of direction. There is a loose but I think suggestive
analogy in the role of causality in science. It is, more than anything else, a commitment that drives (rather than is justified within) science, a commitment to
account for phenomena with reference to the consensual, if always shifting, framework on which science is built.
157
For example, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1971) (in
which the Court held that issuance of a liquor license to a discriminating club was
insufficient to trigger state action) the parties stipulated that the Lodge "is, in all
respects, private in nature and does not appear to have any public characteristics."
Id., 179 n.1 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
158 E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
159 E.g., Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
16o Cf. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (,convictions of Negro "sit-in"
demonstrators were reversed and remanded; subsequent law made refusal to serve
on the basis of race illegal, casting doubt upon the validity of the convictions).
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principal interest is to identify the obligations that may be triggered
by the actor's own organizational characteristics 161 rather than by
the services it provides, or by the acts or acquiescences of other
actors, indisputably governmental, from which it benefits in realizing its challenged objectives.
To illustrate, consider the challenge to a self-help repossession,
for failure of the creditor to abide by constitutionally appropriate
procedures. The plaintiff may base its state action claim on the
adoption by the state of laws that legitimate such a repossession,
such as the relevant portions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
and the state's title registration mechanisms. 162 That is the basis
of the traditional challenge that, as we gather from Flagg Brothers
v. Brooks,16 3 seems destined to fail without the active participation
of a party who may fairly be said to be a state actor (as was the case
in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.).' e4 But imagine, by contrast, selfhelp repossession by an automobile company that is the beneficiary
of large government contracts, or federal loan guarantees, or whose
management structure has been subject to the sort of governmental
review exercisable under the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act. 1 0
On those facts, the plaintiff could urge state action on the basis that
the company's public characteristics had become so dominant as to
transform its own character from private to public. It would not
be a necessary condition of the plaintiff's case to trace its grievance
back through the actor who is the immediate cause of its complaint
to any "other" public body.
The second reason for the special narrowness of our own inquiry is that the actors whose obligations we are examining are all
161 It is not always easy to disentangle the private actor's own characteristics
from the actions of a state actor, because the former can always be portrayed as

deriving in some way from the latter. For example, one might say that merely
by being chartered by the state, a private
the state from the start. And there are
whatever it does because the state allows
be tantamount to the elimination of state

corporation's existence is entangled with
various arguments to make that it does
it. But to go to those extremes would
action as a viable concept, and thus the

burying of fundamental distinctions, at considerable risk to our form of government.
See supra note 156.
162 See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973) (defendant bank's use of state prejudgment self-help repossession statute
does not constitute sufficient state involvement to support cause of action for

deprivation of civil rights under color of law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
163436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman's proposed sale of goods entrusted to

him for storage, as permitted by the U.C.C., is not state action).

See generally

Brest, A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. RPv. 1296 (1982).
.1
102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).

165 See 15 U.S.C. § 1845(b) (1976).
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organizations, as distinct from ordinary, natural persons. This consideration is significant because state action analysis commits us not
only to determine which actors should bear the burdens to which
we subject governments; it also requires us to determine which
actors are entitled to the liberties of citizens. On this latter score
one finds, running throughout the law and its literature, reservations about how fully constitutional liberties should, or even intelligibly could, apply to corporations-to for-profit corporations in
particular.
Many of the reservations about according corporations full
liberties have been expressed in terms of their large economic
power. 1 6 Such objections I want to put to one side as not being
claims about corporate liberties per se; they really raise questions
about the rightful constraints on wealth generally. 167 Our concern
is with reservations that are supposed to derive from the peculiarly
corporate or organizationalcharacteristics of organizations, as such,
irrespective of their power. As early as Bank of Augusta v. Earle 168
and Paul v. Virginia,'6 9 a corporation ("[t]hat invisible, intangible,
and artificial being," Chief Justice Marshall had called it 1'0) was
deemed not to be a "citizen" within the privileges-and-immunitiesof-citizens clause of the Constitution.' 7 ' The fourth amendment is
available to corporations, but not on the same basis as to natural
persons. 72 The fifth amendment's self-incrimination provision
166 See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of
Personal Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933
(1952).
167 Consider, for example, Hobhouse's position that severer restrictions should
be imposed on property-for-power than on property-for-use. See, L. T. HOBHOUSE,
The Historical Evolution of Property, In Fact and In Idea, in Pnorpzns: ITS DUTIrs
Aim
RiGHrs 22-24 (1922).
168 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
169 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
7
1 OBank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
Cf. Pilgrim Real Estate v. Superintendent of
L71 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
Police, 330 Mass. 250, 112 N.E.2d 796 (1953) (corporation not "citizen" qualified
to sue to enforce ordinance).
7 2
1 In Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), the Supreme
Court opined that the fourth amendment, "if applicable, at the most guards against
abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to
be 'particularly described."' Id. 208 (emphasis added). The Court observed that
"[h]istorically private corporations have been subject to broad visitorial power,
both in England and in this country," from which had emerged a "settled [practice] that corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which
private individuals have in these and related matters." Id. 204-05.
By 1949 it had been established that corporations were entitled to fourth
amendment protection, but that they "can claim no equality with individuals in the
enjoyment of a right to privacy." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
652 (1949). The Court explained only that:
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And although corpo-

rations have been accorded free speech protection 7 4 there is no
clear consensus that they enjoy it in the same degree as ordinary
persons.175 As for the fourteenth amendment, corporations seem to
have succeeded to the status of equal protection "persons" in a
rather casual ruling from the bench. 1 8
They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact
upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial
entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them
an enhanced measure of regulation.
Id. See also United States v. Alabama Highway Express, 46 F. Supp. 450 (N.D.
Ala. 1942) (motor carrier, regarded as a species of public utility, not to be accorded the same constitutional guarantees of privacy as an ordinary citizen in his
private business).
173See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906); see also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (U.S. Communist Party does not enjoy immunity with regard to its books and records).
174 See First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (first
amendment protection not lost "simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove . . . a material effect on its business or property."); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (both upholding power
companies' freedom of speech rights). See generally Note, The Corporation and
the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 YAr.L.J. 1833
(1981).
75
1 In Bellotti, the dissenting opinions of White (joined by Brennan and Marshall) and of Rehnquist reflected more readiness to distinguish between corporate
and natural persons. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 802-28. See generally Patton &
Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The PoliticalImpact of Legal
1981 Wis. L. Rv. 494.
Mythology,
178 See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). In Bell, the Court noted that
corporations are entitled to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Douglas, in Appendix I to his separate opinion, observed the casualness of
the first such ruling, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394
(1886), the Court having disposed of the issue from the bench. See 378 U.S. at
262.
Justice Brandeis was unpersuaded about endowing corporations with full
fourteenth amendment liberties (see Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)), as was Justice Black, see Connecticut General Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (fourteenth amendment not intended to apply to corporate persons). Justice Douglas's view was
similar. In Bell v. Maryland, a case involving the right of a corporate food chain
not to serve Negroes, he noted that the firm's president had expressly disavowed
that the segregation was "my policy, my personal prejudice." Justice Douglas went
on to ask:
So far as the corporate owner is concerned, what constitutional right
is vindicated? It is said that ownership of property carries the right to
use it in association with such people as the owner chooses. The corporate
owners in these cases-the stockholders-are unidentified members of the
public at large, who probably never saw these petitioners, who may
never have frequented these restaurants. What personal rights of theirs
would be vindicated by affirmance? Why should a stockholder in Kress,
Woolworth, Howard Johnson, or any other corporate owner in the
restaurant field have standing to say that any associational rights personal
to him are involved? Why should his interests-his associational rightsmake it possible to send these Negroes to jail?
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Presumably, the strength of the cases for and against deeming
corporations constitutional "persons" varies from one doctrinal area
to another. The corporation's claim would seem strongest in areas
such as free speech, in which, as the Court recognized in First
7 the corporation's political participation
National Bank v. Bellotti".7
can advance the values of pluralism, and its voice can add to the
public debate. Hence, there is an argument for endowing the
corporation with speech-liberty that is fairly straightforwardly reducible to underlying human claims.
In other areas, however, claims on behalf of the corporation
are not so transparently traceable to individuals, and there the
situation gets cloudy. 7 8s Where an ordinary mortal is concerned, we
can discern a value in preserving a sphere, free from state influence,
in which he or she may be arbitrary, capricious, and prejudicial.
Giving the individual this right-to-be-wrong, to make his or her
own way, commands support because, among other things, it promotes the exercise and development of individual wills and personalities, personalities that may produce better citizens in the long
run.179
It is not as easy to find corresponding reasons to nurture virtues
in a corporation's "personality." That is, even if it is intelligible
to speak of a corporation, as such, being arbitrary, capricious or
Who, in this situation, is the corporation? Whose racial prejudices
are reflected in "its" decision to refuse service to Negroes? The racial
prejudices of the manager? Of the stockholders? Of the board of
directors?
378 U.S. at 261-62.
3.77478 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)
(State would have to demonstrate compelling
state interest to prevent corporation from informing electorate).
178Even concerning corporate free speech, some of the justices have their
doubts as to whether the connection to humans is close enough.
Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the
First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression,
self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate
speech. It is clear that the communications of profitmaking corporations
are not "an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self." They do not represent a manifestation
of individual freedom or choice.
Id. 804-05 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting T. EMERSON, TowARD A GENmAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AmENDMENT 5 (1966)).
'79 See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969) (holding
that requiring combat duty in the Vietnam War of a Selective Service registrant
who was conscientiously opposed to American military activities in Vietnam, but
who was not in a formal sense a religious conscientious objector, violated first and
fifth amendments). In Sisson, Chief Judge Wyzanski emphasized defendant's
sincere and conscientious consideration of the issues. "The true secret of legal
might lies in the habits of conscientious men disciplining themselves to obey the
law they respect without the necessity of judicial and administrative orders."
Id. 911.
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prejudicial (I think it is),' s° it is more difficult to defend a corporation's freedom to be so on the basis of values connected with the
corporation's personality development. That is one reason it is
easier to make a case for-and against ""1-endowing a corporation
with legal rights by appealing to some mortal's derivative moral
claims, than to argue for a corporation's legal right based on moral
claims that are predominantly its own. No one doubts, for example, that associations provide the framework for developing
personal relations prized on many theories of personality, liberty,
and state. 8 2 Indeed, many of the rights claimed by associations in
180 We commonly pass moral judgments upon groups in ordinary language:
"Germany was wrong to have invaded Poland." The speaker is understood to be
characterizing the behavior of a nation on the plane of national behavior, a judgment that is obviously related to, but not straightforwardly deducible from, the
blameworthy conduct of particular German leaders---of Hitler, of Goering, and
so on.
It seems even more appropriate to ascribe various moral and morally relevant
attributes to a corporation as such, rather than to its human agents, when the
conduct supporting the judgment seems less grounded in the deliberate acts of the
agents, as in the corporation's formal and informal information and authority
systems. For example, one employee, a scientist, may know that a substance X
at temperature Y poses danger, but not know that the conditions are being realized
in one of the plants. Another employee, a plant engineer, identifies the conditions,
but does not know that they are dangerous. Further, there is nothing in the
company's internal operating procedures to bring the two agents together. Surely,
if an explosion results, it is not clear we should blame either employee. Blaming
others, such as the top managers or the stockholders (for their omissions) is possible,
but may overextend the reach of the blaming terms, until they lose their significance.
If we are to ascribe blame in the circumstances at all, it would not be unreasonable
to blame (or in some circumstances, praise) the corporation.
Elsewhere, I have outlined the case for such attributions on the ground that
moral language is part of a socializing process; "good" and "bad" behavior can in
some circumstances be better taught by ascribing moral terms to the corporation,
e.g., "the Z auto company was 'bad' to have produced such an unsafe car," rather
than stretching "bad" to cover the behavior of employees none of whom, individually, was in a position to foresee the dangers. See Stone, Corporation Accountability in Law and Morals, in Tnm JunEo-CHmRsTmN VISIoN AND THE MoDnN
BusINEss CORPORA-MON (1982).

The case for distinct corporate praise and blame is probably strongest respecting acts which in their nature cannot be performed by a mortal, but only by
a corporation, e.g., merging, declaring dividends, repurchasing stock.
181 For example, some of the arguments against corporate free speech are also
instrumental, rooted in the notion that corporations possess so much power they
might drown out other speakers. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 810 (White, J., dissenting). The drowning out considerations can be raised even more forcefully when
the speaker is a government rather than a private corporation.
See Shiffrin,
Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 565, 595-601 (1980).
182 Professor Hurst has called the freedom of private associations, including
corporations, "a value built sturdily into our habits of life. . . . Exercising their
freedom to enlist with others and using law positively to mobilize group power in
behalf of individual states, people groped towards [a] policy expressly what they
felt as a basic truth of civilized existence." f. HURST, LAw AN Iaa CONDITIONS
OF FREEDOM In THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED

STATES

86 (1964).
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their own name have been recognized on this basis. 8 3
Other situations exist, however, in which the liberty being
claimed in the organization's name cannot as convincingly be traced
to the normally recognized benefits of associated natural persons.
The fifth amendment provides a good example. We cannot say
that, if the corporation were allowed to plead the fifth amendment,
no natural persons would benefit. In many circumstances, shareholders, officers, and employees would all stand to benefit if the
protection shielded the corporation's accounts from legal liabilities.
A satisfactory explanation must include the fact that it is (among
other things) particularly humiliating, frightening, and depersonalizing to be compelled to testify against oneself. But when we
compel the corporation's testimony, as when we search its records,
the natural persons whom the action affects derivatively are not
affected in the same way, not humiliated, as if their own testimony
were being compelled, or their own papers searched. Hence, at least
in some contexts, corporations can be denied liberties of natural
persons without forcibly and directly colliding with personal autonomy values.184
Certainly a lot more could be said on the subject of endowing
corporations with independent rights and liabilities. The only
point I want to raise here is that, until a firmer foundation can
183See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(State
could not compel NAACP to disclose its membership lists because disclosure would
be likely to restrain the freedom of association of its members). Note also that
Justice Douglas, notwithstanding his sentiments in Bell, began his dissent in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1971) with the remark that the
first amendment and the Bill of Rights
create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering
with private clubs or groups. The associational rights which our system
honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be
formed. .. . Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her
associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.
Id. 179-80 (footnote omitted). Certainly, that is the view espoused by the Court
in such leading associational rights cases as Gibson v. Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson: the Court
views itself to be protecting the liberty claims of clearly identifiable individual
members, not of the group as some sort of transcendental remainder.
8
1 4 Meir Dan Cohen makes a thorough and thoughtful presentation of such a
position in M. D. COHmN, PmsONS AND ORGA ZATIONS: A LEGAL THEoRY (forthcoming, University of California Press, 1983).
Note that it is not inevitable that we should prefer the direct legal rights of
natural persons over those that might intelligibly be established by some group, and
that might, if recognized, benefit persons only in a derivative, even diluted way.
One can imagine a society in which the preferences were reversed-where families,
municipalities or other groups were so highly valued politically and communally
that the unit, not the individual, was accorded a preferred position. Such an ideal
is examined in A. KoEsTLEn, DAwunauss AT NooN (1941). See also H. MAWr,
ANczmN LAw 142-43 (1930) in which Henry Maine considered "families" in a
corporate sense to be the primary units of primitive society.
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be laid for defending corporations in their own rights, corporations
might have to be recognized as a special subset of liberty holders,
with the burden on them of proving their entitlement to some
liberties, particularly when the connection is tenuous between corporate liberties and the moral claims of identifiable humans.
In sum, this subsection suggests that in determining what fairness obligations we may legitimately impose on an organization,
two related but separable examinations of its public and private
characteristics are required. The first is to determine the warrant
for obliging the organization to act as though it were a government;
the second, the warrant for protecting it as though it were a natural
person.
D. A Case for the Public/PrivateDistinction: The Moral
Exemplar Model
Is there any rational basis for altering the fairness obligations
that we demand of an actor depending upon its organizational
characteristics, either because those characteristics restrict the liberty
claims to which it is entitled as a citizen, or enlarge the public
obligations it needs to bear as a government?
I think the answer is yes. Let me use as the basis for illustration Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co.185 In that case, respondent
was a privately owned and operated electric utility. It held a
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the public
utility commission, which had the power to review certain managerial decisions, including proposed tariffs. Petitioner, a user,
suffered one termination of service for nonpayment of her bills.
She managed to reestablish the benefits of respondent's power, although she continued to avoid the ordinary financial burdens, by
putting the account in the names of others with less sullied credit
(including her twelve-year-old son), 8 6 and, allegedly, by a little
meter-tampering for good measure. 187 When respondent's employees
discovered that they had unwittingly extended her about a year's
additional grace, they cut off her service without the ado to which
petitioner believed herself entitled under the Constitution. She
brought a section 1983 action, seeking damages for the termination,
and an injunction requiring restoration of power services until she
had been afforded notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any
amounts found owing.
185 419 U.S. 345 (1974).

Id. 347.
187 Id. 347.
1S6
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The Jacksbn majority rejected petitioner's claim for failure to
demonstrate sufficient connection between respondent's conduct and
the actions of the state. The Court expressly reserved, however,
the question "whether 'due process of law' would require a State
taking similar action to accord petitioner the procedural rights for
which she contends." 188 The answer to that reserved issue is
our quest. Would there be any reason for a different outcome if
the same conduct occurred, but the utility was not investor-owned
but municipal?
The policy basis for making that distinction is surely not obvious, to put it mildly. Why, and to whom, should the actor's
organizational character matter? Mrs. Jackson, it is safe to suppose,
felt however badly she did without giving public/private much
thought. Those who mull these fine lines might have discovered
grounds for added indignity, had the defendant been a public
utility, in the fact it would have been her own agents who did her
wrong. But one can as forcefully point out that, because the agents
of a public utility would have been more proximately under her
electoral control, their actions could have been characterized, to
that extent, as more legitimate.
In the final analysis, the basis for imposing separate obligations
based on public/private characteristics is so obscure in such situations, that the courts, impelled by the Constitution to locate some
dividing line, may be tempted to seize upon any that is distinct.
Thus, we are left to suppose that for lack of any better boundary, a
decision could turn on whether the utility in question was incorporated under the municipal code or under the general corporations
code-even if that means little more than that in the one case it
sells only bonds to the public, and in the other it sells both its
bonds and its common stock. In either case, its securities are going
to wind up, we may imagine, side by side in the same investment
portfolios, anyway.
I propose to advance a case for distinct treatment on a basis
that is not so arbitrary. The model on which it rests is not aimed
at providing a general theory of state action, because it gives only a
partial account of why actors indisputably governmental (Congress,
the courts, a city council) have come to bear special obligations
under the Constitution. But the part it does provide is the part
for which theory matters most, to sort out the hybrid actors whose
public/private status is most genuinely in doubt. The central idea
188

Id. 359.

1494

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1441

develops from the notion that the virtues we are seeking under the
mantle of fairness are public goods.
Suppose first that in an ideal society people are considerate,
temperate, nonarbitrary, and display the various other virtues with
which "fairness" is associated. Being among people who deal with
each other civilly is a benefit in itself; life is nicer that way. But
there is an additional benefit. Ordering through law entails various costs. Thus, social practices that enable us to replace law with
good manners as a way of organizing and coordinating behavior
offer certain advantages.'8 9 For this reason, each person's exercise
of virtue-and the very expectation of that exercise-provides a
common benefit. 190
The practicers of virtue cannot, however, fully capture in exchanges the benefits their virtues are conferring on society. 191 I
derive benefits from your virtues, from which you cannot exclude
me. We could respond by passing laws requiring such virtues of
everyone. But that is hardly ideal. Even when enforcing virtue
is intelligible (and it is not always so: consider mandatory altruism),
the public enforcement of virtue probably rankles more than the
public suppression of vice. 192

In all events, the attempt to enforce

virtue everywhere we found it flagging not only would be costly, it
would, for most of us, unacceptably extend the power and reach
of government.
There is appeal, therefore, in a solution that eschews the enforcement of all virtues universally, and instead appoints one
sector-government-as a moral model or teacher, an exemplar of
virtue. This is a notion that has cropped up from time to time,
ordinarily in the field of criminal procedure. Consider Justice
Brandeis's memorable dissent in Olmstead v. United States '93: "Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
189 See McKean, Economics of Trust, Altruism, and Corporate Responsibility,
in ALTRusm, MonA.Lrry, AND ECONOMIC THmoRy 29 (E. S. Phelps ed. 1975).
190 For example, the gathering of taxes depends to a large measure on taxpayers feeling that to pay their share is the right and fair thing to do--and that

people ought to be right and fair. Hence, even if I wanted to be wholly arbitrary,
I would still (in the lingo of the literature) "bribe" others to be equitable, for the
generally prevailing level of amenity is of some value to me.
191 The practice of some virtues, such as dealing with consumers or employees
more fairly than law and contracts require, can produce a private benefit through

the enhancement of the actor's good reputation. I am more interested, however,

in the benefits conferred on society by the practicer that do not inure to its own
economic benefit.

192 See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HAnv. L. Rlv. 630, 670-72 (1958) (objections to legal coercion to virtue).
'93 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." 194 The same
idea finds expression in one argument against the death penalty,
not that the murderer does not deserve it, but that the government
ought not to practice, and so to exemplify, the. conduct that carrying it out involves. The intuition, is that the government should
comport itself fairly independent of a particular complainant's
rights; there are certain things government simply should not dowhether as prosecutor,195 as landlord, 198 or as distributor of benefits
197
and privileges.
The notion that certain virtues are public goods-that if the
government flags in its moral leadership, it is the entire collective
that suffers 198-is one way to flesh out these intuitions. Before il194Id. 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Exemplar considerations may be more
ubiquitous, even if not often identified as such. See, e.g., the contract clause, U.S.
CoNsr., art. I, § 10, cl. 1; United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21
n.17 (1977) (state legislation entailing "serious disruption of . . . bondholders'
expectations" under prior interstate covenant deemed violation of contract clause).
195 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (discussed supra note
139).
Under the theory espoused in the text, one might argue that the government
had a duty, and not just the power and privilege, to prosecute and punish those
who did
wrong.
196 See Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (right of District of Columbia public housing tenants to sue for improper
maintenance upheld as against claim of sovereign immunity). The court found
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in "a considerable state of disrepair, at least in
terms of intellectual respectability," id. 251, and assumed the power "to declare
[government's] responsibility" as a landlord, id. 1053. Cf. Powelton Civic Home
Owners Ass'n v. Dep't. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 831 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (Secretary of HUD "implicitly obliged by due process to make fair, nonarbitrary decisions" regarding urban renewal, with consequence that residents of
area affected by proposed urban renewal project have opportunity to submit evidence prior to decision).
19 See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (enjoining
Secretary of Agriculture from debarring plaintiffs from participating in dealings
with Commodity Credit Corporation absent procedural regulations, without need
to reach question whether debarment violated due process standards). Judge (now
Chief Justice) Burger stated "to say that there is no 'right' to government contracts
does not resolve the question of justiciability. Of course there is no such right;
but that cannot mean that the government can act arbitrarily, either substantively
Id. 574 (emphasis in original).
or procedurally, against a person ......
198 The Model does not, however, stand or fall on the plausibility to construe
virtue as a public good in a full technical sense. The reader who prefers to substitute a less pretentious vocabulary of public benefits and burdens will not miss
much-and may, indeed, keep better sight of the moral underpinnings that economic
(and pseudo-economic) analysis tends to obscure.
Nothing in this Model would modify the requirements for standing: to challenge the government's action there still must be a complainant demonstrating an
invasion of his or her protected interest. But it would empower a court, when
passing on the claim, to impose greater burdens on the government than what
appears to be owed the complainant under some theory of the complainant's rights.
The suggestion of the Model is that the burdens may appropriately rise to a level
commensurate with the benefits to be collectively realized through the exemplary
value of the government's good comportment.
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lustrating the Moral Exemplar Model, however, it is worth noting
that the moral exemplar considerations-teaching by good exampleare not the only reasons we might have special concern that the
government, in particular, be fair. The alternative to self-control
through fairness is social control through law. But in the case of
the government itself, control through law presents special difficulties. For example, many of the things we find most vexing
about government behavior, including the haphazard processing of
applications, bureaucratic shirking, indifference, delays, inaction,
and unevenhanded exercise of administrative discretion, 1 9 are difficult to influence through a system of liability rules or, indeed,
any sort of legal procedure that fastens hope on traditional judicial
review. (Consider the limits of review, each in its own way, of
governmental impoliteness, covert intelligence operations, and the
waging of war.) To keep government accountable, we need to
encourage the public sector to habituate to desired patterns of behavior. The best way to do this, to alter the behavior of a bureaucracy, is to develop appropriate bureaucratic rules, and all the other
200
factors that go into shaping an internal organizational ethos.

Reforms of this sort, aimed at making institutions more caring,
have been advocated by myself and others, under the rubric of
corporate social responsibility, in regard to actors in the private
sector. 201 But the case for assuring organizational responsibility,
implemented through tangible institutional reform, is at least as
critical among the public as among the private organizations. Thus,
improvement of the government's own operations provides a strong
basis for developing public agencies into paragons of virtue, aside
from the educative value which that development would have on
others, the thrust of the Moral Exemplar Model.
E. The Moral Exemplar Model Illustrated
To furnish reasons that the government in particular should
be fair does not tell us all we need to know. The question remains,
who, for these purposes of sorting hybrid actors is government?
Let me illustrate how the Moral Exemplar Model may provide
some satisfactory guidance.
199 See Mashaw, supra note 85, at 10-12.
200 See J. MAsIw, BuRrAucRnc JusTICE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM A
INERNAL PERsPEcTIVE (forthcoming, Yale Univ. Press, 1983). (Effort
the normative concerns of administrative law with positive concerns

tional theory).
201 See C.

STONE,

supra note 75, at 111-18.

to integrate
of organiza-
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First, the Moral Exemplar Model supports the intuition that
special significance should be attached to the public reaction. If an
actor or action is identified in the public mind .with the. government, we should be more demanding for that reason alone. (This
proposition provides one of the Model's entres for the .traditional
public service criterion.) 202 For example, it is true that General
Motors is big and powerful; nonetheless,. its actions are not likely
to be interpreted as the expression of the collective will. Similarly,
20 3
when a private club is tolerated to discriminate against Negroes,
it does not convey the message that racial discrimination is an accepted norm in the same way that message was conveyed, for example, when the United States Armed Services were segregated.
Granted, everyone knows that governments have extensive
power to step into situations to prevent unfairness, either through
conditioning necessary licenses, such as the liquor license in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,204 or through general legislation. Failure
to exercise that power can be pointed to as evidence that the actor's
conduct is being politically condoned. The flaw in this reasoning
is .that there are reasons for government to stay its hand that do
not imply approval-the most important being the recognition of
liberty interests.2 0 5
On the same basis, I think we would be justified in demanding more from, for example, the Boy Scouts and the Little League,
than from other incorporated nonprofits. Holding federal charters
by special acts of Congress, such organizations' failings will be worse
because what they imply will be worse: popular and authoritative
sanction for whatever they are doing wrong.20 6 For another example, although Comsat's three Presidentially-appointed directors
can always be outvoted, they give the corporation the appearance
2 02

The Model also accounts for this criterion in another way. See infra text
accompanying note 220.
Of course, the
203See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
same reasoning will substantiate closely scrutinizing unfairness by firms and other
organizations that, because of the services they provide, are identified with the
government.
204407 U.S. 163 (1972).
205
The distinction I make in text is grounded in a dichotomy between acts
of omission and acts of commission that is always difficult to sustain under close
examination. Yet, the fact that the distinction appeals to common sense, and
thereby influences ordinary moral discourse, is a significant credential under the
present analysis.
206
But see King v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 505 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir.
1974) (in sex discrimination suit by girls seeking to play in Little League, fact of
congressional charter did not make corporation's actions "state" actions for section
1983 purposes).
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that the government has its hand, at least symbolically, on the helm,
which has special exemplary significance under the Model.
The second set of implications involves the relationships between the actor's finances and the public purse. To judge from
the cases, the receipt of government financial support, such as a
federally-insured mortgage, will not in itself subject the beneficiary
to the full panoply of government fairness obligations. 20 7 What
compounding of the financial relationship should be required?
For the Moral Exemplar Model, the answer begins with the
fact that, typically, fairness costs. It costs to provide procedural
hearings; it costs to police and clean up after leaflet distributors;
and it even costs more, let us assume, to teach in an atmosphere
distracted by long hair and arm bands. But associated with these
costs are benefits, benefits that flow not only to the suspended
student or evicted leaflet distributor, but to the entire society. We
are assuming, moreover, that the optimal situation is achieved by
enforcing the desired conduct among some "public" actors only,
encouraging others to comply by good example. If these assumptions are valid, 208 and the justification is to advance the common
benefit, it would therefore seem appropriate for the associated costs
to be shouldered by the public at large. Hence, the Model implies
that, at least when presented with these close choices, we should
distinguish public from private in a way that most nearly assigns
the burdens to general revenues.
To illustrate, suppose first a case in which the actor's principal
financial connection with a government is a government license
issued as part of a government regulatory scheme, as in Moose
Lodge 209 and in Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee.210 In these cases, suits not to discriminate
207See, e.g., Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Friendly, J.) (no trial-type hearing prior to rent increase required of landlord
whose connection with government was limited to financial assistance under
National Housing Act). But see Ressler v. Landrieu, 502 F. Supp. 324 (D. Alaska
1980) (owner of housing project benefiting from government-insured mortgage
required to provide specific, uniform criteria and due process hearing in rejecting
otherwise eligible applicants under § 8 of the Housing Assistance Program).
208 Their empirical validity is not, unfortunately, self-evident. The assumptions
include: (1) that morality-at least of some sorts-is more effectively com-

municated when the teacher is identified with the public than with the private

sector; (2) that the government acting rightly only under court order does not
rob the good example of its educative force; and (3) that the conduct we want of
nongovernments resembles what we want of governments closely enough-that the
lesson is transportable from one sector to the other.
209

407

U.S. 163 (1972). As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent, "[liquor

licensing laws are only incidentally revenue measures .....
210 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

Id. 184-85.
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(which the Court rejected) would ,have concentrated losses on the
licensees, who could not have. passed them back throughout the
entire benefitting public. 211 Contrast that with the situation presented in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.212 In that
case, a state-created, publicly financed parking authority leased part
of a parking facility to a private restaurant, which practiced racial
discrimination. The Court.found state action on the basis that the
Authority had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the lessee restaurant owner] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on
that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private'
as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." 213
There are several ways to interpret the contrasting results in
Burton and Moose Lodge. One way is to contrast the symbolic
elements of the situation: after all, the parking authority building
flew, quite literally, the flags of government. 214 But another way,
more in line with our present search for an economic basis for
distinction, starts by accepting the defendant's testimony that a
restaurant in that locale could make more money racially discriminating than not.21 5 Because of the constitutional constraints obviously applicable to the public authority, it was not free to realize
this highest economic use by operating the premises discriminatorily
on its own account. However, if the government were allowed to
lease the space to another party who was free to discriminate, at a
rental that reflected the added value of that option, the government
would share in the economic benefits of the misconduct.2 16
This discussion suggests one perfectly plausible way to characterize the arrangement as state action: to deem the lessee an
instrument of the public authority through which the government
sought impermissibly to capture economic benefits of discrimination. 217 This argument, however, seems to prove too much. There
211

Of course, the licensee could choose not to reapply for a license, and go

out of business.
212

365 U.S. 715 (1961).

213 Id. 725.
2 14

See id. 720.
building.)
215

(Both state and national flags flew from the parking authority

See id. 724.

am supposing some measure of monopoly advantage to inhere in a
coffee shop that is located in the parldng building itself.
217The Court seems to have favored some such construction. See Burton, 365
U.S. at 724. Since the delivery of this paper, however, the Court in Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982), distinguished Burton with the statement that "no
symbiotic relationship such as existed in Burton exists here.", Id. 2772.
No
explanation of "symbiotic relationship" was offered which might distinguish the
216e
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are many situations in which the government shares financial benefits of private parties doing what the government could not have
done itself, in which we would not be so ready to imply state action.
For example, in the many cases in which the government insures a
housing project mortgage, or guarantees a loan, its financial position
is also improved (through a reduced likelihood of default), whenever the borrower has the option to discriminate, or unburden itself
of various due process-type obligations. Indeed, as long as the
private actor is paying taxes, the government stands to benefit via
increased tax revenues from any profits that unfairness produces. 218
Hence, if a benefit to the public purse were all that was necessary
to constitute state action, the courts would be forced to review
almost all social activity for unfairness, absent legislative direction.
A virtue of the Moral Exemplar Model is that we may be
able to extract from it a principled way to limit state action from
such a fatal overbreadth. Observe that in Burton, the government
stood to capture essentially all the economic benefits of the discrimination, assuming perfect competition among bidders for the
lease. Hence, the Court's decision prohibiting the arrangement
eliminated from public revenues essentially the full measure of the
ill-gotten gains. To make up such loss, the parking authority will
have to turn either to the state treasury, or to the public bond
market. Whichever it does, the preponderant costs of setting a
morally correct example will be borne by the public, which is
exactly where they ought to lie. Note that the same consequence,
the apportionment of essentially all "fairness" costs on general
revenues, would not result from a plaintiff's victory when the
government is insuring mortgages, or guaranteeing loans,219 or is a
regulatory licensor, as in Moose Lodge, or CBS. In those situations,
cases, and none, certainly, is implied by the Model.

If anything, the strong gloss

of traditional public function in Rendell-Baker, which involved providing secondary
education under a state contract, thus binding the service provider to an extensive
panoply of state
responsibility; the
of fairness costs
students educated

regulations, would strengthen the public's perception of state
apparent implication, that the state was allowed to contract out
traditionally borne by the state (due process for teachers of
at public expense) makes the different outcomes even worse.

See infra text accompanying note 242.
2 18

Assume, for example, that the expenses of a due process-type hearing would

qualify as a business expense for a private corporation, and thus as a deduction from

taxable income.
219 This assumes that the government is charging fees as part of a regulatory
scheme-more or less to cover costs rather than enhancing its profits. If, for

example, the government auctioned radio licenses the way it auctions outer
continental shelf oil and gas leases, then, under my analysis, CBS would be less

like Moose Lodge and more like Burton.
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extending state action would concentrate costs on a distinct subgroup, a result that courts have been reluctant to decree.
The Moral Exemplar Model provides both a theory to substantiate this reluctance, and a functional rule of thumb for sorting
public from private: we should be readier to deem an actor "public"
when the preponderant costs of doing so will be imposed on the
benefitting public at-largeY-0
There are two other significant implications of the Moral
Exemplar Model which deserve comment, although they do not
contribute to sort out public from private as much as to suggest
what to do once something has been identified as one or the other.
The first implication has to do with judicial review; the second,
with remedies.
With regard to judicial. review, the Model suggests some shift
in the actions receiving closest scrutiny. The Model favors government's bearing the heaviest costs of exemplifying virtue. But a
casual survey of actual legislation leaves the impression that in
imposing expensive norms, lawmakers are inclined to go lighter
on the public sector. OSHA is applicable to private employers,
but units of government are expressly exempt,2 21 as they are from
the National Labor Relations Act.222 Congress has long exempted
itself from Title VII's restrictions against discriminatory hiring.22 3
The securities laws, at least until recently, have imposed less onerous
restrictions on governmental issuers. 224
The explanation for this self-favoring treatment may be as
simple as that legislatures are more sympathetic to their own and
220

The concept of "benefiting public" is introduced to suggest that if the
expected benefits were, for example, statewide, there would be a preference for
making the state population bear them. Obviously, determining the boundaries of
the benefiting community is a rough business.
Let me add by way of postscript that the theory in the text will not justify
Rendell-Baker v. Koin, 102 S. Ct 2764 (1978), on this point either, see supra note
217, but then, I cannot think of any likeable theory that will. In that case, 90 to
99% of the "private" school's operating budget (the proportion varied from year to
year) derived from state funds. Id. 4826. Query: can privately-supplied capital
funds22 have
been of significant magnitude?
1
See supra note 43.
222
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) ("employer" subject to National Labor
Relations Act not to include United States and its instrumentalities, or state or
subdivisions
thereof).
223
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (Congress does not include
itself as an "employer" subject to equal employment opportunities legislation unless
hiring pursuant to competitive service). But see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979) (woman employee fired from congressional administrative position because
"essential that understudy to my administrative assistant be a man," id. 230 n.3,
allowed suit under fifth amendment).
224 See Steinberg, Municipal Issuer Liability Under the Federal Securities Law,
6 J.CoRP. L. 277 (1981).
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kindred bodies' budgets than they are to those of private entities.
Or it may connect to broader, more general patterns of domestic
politics, such as has led-James Q. Wilson to observe that: "In general, it is easier for a public agency to change the behavior of a
private organization than of another public agency." 225 But whatever the cause, the tendency suggests special reason for courts to
consider suspect any legislation that concentrates the costs of ex226
emplary behavior on subgroups, and away from government.
The second implication of the Model concerns support for the
present inclination of the law to disfavor punitive damages when
the defendant is public. It is quite understandable that we allow,
for example, a suspect or an inmate who has suffered a constitutional tort to sue a public entity for ordinary compensatory damages. But there is, I think, something intuitively unappealing
about awarding punitive damages in these circumstances. Witness
that although ordinary damages are allowed against a municipality
under section 1983, punitive damages have been denied. 227 Various
reasons have been given for this reluctance to award punitive damages against governments, many of which are, as I pointed out,
unpersuasive-for example, that the damages will simply be nulli228
fied by the taxing power.

The better argument against punitive damages, at least as regards Region II relief, would seem to be as follows: if the constitutionally required character 229 can be specified, and if a public in225 Wilson & Rachal, Can the Government Regulate Itself?, THE PUBLIC INTEREST
3-4, Winter 1977 (emphasis in original).
22
6To carry this thesis through, however, one needs a theory of active judicial
review that is hardly self-evident. We are not concerned here with legislative
failure or disfavored minorities. The thesis requires active intervention despite,
first, the tenuous constitutional status of some of the claims (health, for example).
Second, the Model's rationale for review is based squarely on the assumption that
the whole community stands to gain from the generalized moral benefits of the
government's considerateness. Why should the court not be obliged to assume that,
if the community were to be so benefited by the measure, the community would
have voted for it? Personally, I think such a role for judicial review can be defended (even to the extent of authorizing interventions) based on the view that
moral benefits are not automatically appreciated by the community, and that one
of the functions we expect of courts is to exercise moral leadership. Exposition
of this thesis is beyond the scope of the present paper.
22 7
See supra note 62. But see Boyd v. Shawnee Mission Public Schools, 522
F. Supp. 1115 (D. Can. 1981) (punitive damages in section 1981 action allowable,
distinguishing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)).
228 See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
229 There are arguments for fairness not directly linked to a constitutional
source. See supra text accompanying notes 139-47. For example, in Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Court held that the Exchange
had to deal fairly with a broker under antitrust principles. When an argument is
so based, the case for interventions is presumably weakened.
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stitution does not possess that character, then structural relief, which
enjoins upon the institution the required properties, should dominate punitive damages, which rely only on the hope of cajoling
them into existence. For example, to the extent that an ombudsman appears constitutionally compelled by the circumstances, then
an ombudsman should be installed by decree; 230 if hearings, hear23 1
ings; if a police review board, then that.

For a court to take such an active hand would constitute
judicial displacement of the ordinary political processes, which I
myself depicted as constitutionally suspect in the analysis of Region
I.232 Even here in Region II, a court should have pause. But in
Region II there are several differences. In Region I, the wrongs
for which correction was demanded, (for example, a local government's failure to meet environmental discharge limits) were not
constitutionally-based. By contrast, in most Region II cases, the
values that are opposed to intervention, such as those of pluralism
and federalism, are met with countervailing constitutional claims
from the plaintiff's side.23 3 Second, what the law desires in Region
I is ordinarily a satisfactory output that is achievable in various
ways, among which the law is indifferent. Here, however, the
institution's internal world is often the very thing under challenge.
I am not, let me remind, offering the Moral Exemplar Model
as a unifying theory for all state action-supposing that such is
possible, which I doubt. 23

Not all state action cases are claims of

unfairness, or can be satisfactorily translated into arguments about
230 1 am referring to an ombudsman integrated into internal institutional functions as part of the substantive relief, and not reporting to the court merely as a
fact-finding master.
231 1 presume that in weighing any decision, the courts will also balance the
many contending reasons to exercise restraint in fashioning structural relief. See
generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 HArv. L. REv. 1 (1979). But I agree with Mel Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell
that the supposedly alarming "novelty" of the structural relief cases has been
overstated. See Eisenberg and Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HAnv. L. Ruv. 465 (1980).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 120-36.

233 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1386-87 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (ordering appointment of Master with broad power to secure institutional reform in
Texas Department of Corrections; despite caution about judges "immersing themselves in the day-to-day management of prison systems . . . the federal courts
cannot avoid the duty to protect constitutionally protected rights."). See generally Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979) (analyzing use of court-appointed master in prisons to bring formal and informal
systems up to constitutional requirements).
234

See supra note 156.
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cost distributions: consider Congress restricting free speech. 23 And
of course the Model employs a social welfare analysis that would
have been foreign, if congenial, to the founders. Nonetheless, the
Model provides us with theory where theory is most needed: for
the margin of active cases in which hybrid actors have to be sorted.
Let me illustrate its value by returning to the question reserved in
236
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
First, a private utility is commonly perceived to be something
apart from government. Although its tariffs are publicly approved,
its directors and managers are selected by private investors and are
known to exercise a certain degree of independence from government. Hence, condoning the company's conduct does not pose the
same risk of demoralizing society as do the acts of a publicly owned
and operated utility. 23

7

Second, when the actor is a private utility,

government does not stand to capture the preponderance of the
financial benefit from eliminating constitutional niceties. To put
it another way, if the courts were to impose upon the private utility
a standard of conduct fit for the state, the consequent costs would
not be apportioned among the benefitting population as ratably as
when the burden is placed on a public utility. Placing the incremental costs on the private utility will concentrate them on
the equity holders, who will be residents of the service area only
fortuitously.
Obviously, there are counter-arguments to be made. The
knowledge that a private utility enjoys a publicly-protected franchise erodes the public perception point. And the possibility that
2 3

5

There are, as well, circumstances in which the state might delegate

func-

tions to a "private" association without capturing any notable economic benefit in
return that should nonetheless be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (racial segregation
practiced by "private" political organizations in connection with primary elections

held unconstitutional notwithstanding state decision "that the exclusion [of blacks]
is produced by private or party action." 321 U.S. at 662).
26419 U.S. 345 (1974), discussed supra text accompanying notes 185-88.
2_37Even though the corporate free speech cases evidence solicitude for a

private utility's autonomy claims, see supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text,
it is doubtful that the latitude would extend to allowing the private utility to
segregate racially, and perhaps not even to discriminate against homosexuals, cf.
Gay Law Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (private corporation operating as public utility could not
exclude homosexuals from employment "because of personal whims or prejudices

or any other arbitrary reason" under equal protection guarantee of state constitution, the federal law not binding).

Racial discrimination by a utility was dis-

allowed at common law, see supra text accompanying notes 23 & 140. Observe that
even if the utility is not deemed public in any particular circumstance, a plaintiff
might yet establish the traditional "nexus" to state action, if officers of the state
in fact exercised dominant control over the particular conduct in question.
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the added costs will be passed through to customers, together with
the capacity of the stock market to reflect in lower stock prices the
costs not passed through, erodes the second.23 8 But to examine the
fine discrimination intended in Edison is to start with just about
the toughest test a state action theory has to meet. In a large class
of cases of growing importance, the Model has a surer capacity to
make discriminations-and to make them rightly, in my view. In
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 239 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, expressly reserved judgment on
the extent, if any, to which a city or State might be free
to delegate to private parties the performance of such
functions [as education, fire and police protection, and tax
avoid the strictures of the Fourcollection] and thereby
2 40
teenth Amendment.
Surely, the Court was right that the possible permutations and
combinations of government-private relationships are so complex
as to caution against passing judgment on them prematurely. 241
But we can say that the Moral Exemplar Model puts whatever
weight it has against allowing governments to contract out of constitutional burdens and reap the lion's share of the resulting
financial benefits. Such an arrangement, which the Court-wrongly,
I believe-recently refused to construe as state action in RendellBaker v. Kohn,242 allows the public purse to benefit just where it
should be burdened.
Although the Moral Exemplar Model thus provides some
grounds for burdening the entities that are symbolically public and
publicly-financed with heavier obligations than their private counterparts, still to be accounted for are the "liberty-claims." We can
anticipate cases in which the considerations collide. For example,
238 That is, if the obligations become the accepted practice, share prices will
duly discount to reflect the anticipated costs of being treated in pair mated with a
public utility.
239 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
240 Id. 163-64.
241 See id. 164.
242
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982); see supra note 222. Blum
v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982), also decided while this Article was being
edited, presents closer questions for the Model. In Blum, the challenged determinations by private doctors in private hospitals to transfer the plaintiff patients
clearly had the consequence of saving money for the state (which was paying for
their care). But there is not the evidence (as there was in Rendell-Baker) that
the institutions involved were so heavily dependent upon state funds as to make
plausible recharacterizing them as public under the Model. Therefore the Court
was consistent with prior decisions to have demanded some showing of control
over the particular action challenged.
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even when the argument for burdening an ostensibly private corporation with the costs fit for government is persuasive, the company might have a strong conflicting argument for recognizing its
liberty-claims qua citizen. Recognition is likely to vary both with
the sort of liberty being claimed, and with the sort of organization
(association, for-profit corporation, pension fund) asserting it. This
243
is an area in which more work is needed.
CONCLUSION

What is public, and what is private, and who cares? We are
now in a better position, if not to give wholly satisfactory answers,
at least to understand why that is so difficult to do.
To begin, the boundaries between public and private, never
clearly marked, have grown, with time, more faint and less valuable.
With regard to Region I, in which the concepts claim some role in
determining the balance between political and judicial control over
delictful misconduct, the significance of the actor's public or private
characteristics may be overshadowed by the exact conduct in question. Are we trying to deter nuclear accidents or defamation?
Similarly, in Region II, in which public and private are involved
in determining fairness obligations, the substance of the claim may
be as significant as the character of the actor. Are we considering
the actor's obligation not to discriminate, not to disturb free speech,
or not to deny a hearing?
Why should anyone persist in trying to draw the line, when
both its original basis and its ultimate significance remain so
obscure?
Part of the answer is that we are not persisting, that the weight
once accorded public/private is in fact lessening. In both the contexts we have examined, that occupied with delicts and that occupied with fairness, the law is being applied with less regard for
earmarks of public and private status, particularly when we consider the entire legal fabric, including not merely court-made and
constitutional doctrine, but also legislation, government contracts,
and licenses. In Region I, the traditional immunities of public
bodies have been eroding. Like private business corporations, they
are being exposed to the discipline of money judgments. Conversely,
private business corporations are being treated increasingly like
public bodies. Law and politics are displacing the market as the
principal constraint on managerial discretion. Correspondingly, in
243

most thorough-going contribution is M. D. COHEN, supra note 184.
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Region II, the trend is for traditionally private bodies-private
associations, private charities, private schools, even private business
corporations-to bear the obligations once associated almost exclusively with governments.
Still, disparities between public and private treatment persist
in the doctrines, no matter how difficult they may be to apply to
the facts. Should not the lingering disparities be effaced altogether-a final merger of public and private?
In each region a different response to this question is required.
In the first region, some distinct treatment along public/private
lines seems destined to remain as long as other features of law and
government are held constant. That is, as long as some actors
(including an important subset of those generally deemed public)
are endowed with unique powers, and subject to viable electoral
accountability, there will be many circumstances favoring political
mechanisms over liability mechanisms to control their misconduct.
Moreover, the question of the appropriate liability-immunity rule
is part of a whole matrix of rules, including those regarding agent
liability, indemnification, respondeat superior, and limited liability.
As long as these rules, deeply embedded in the law, continue to
vary along a (roughly drawn) public/private line, some distinction
in liabilities treatment seems ineradicable.
In the second region, the public/private distinction is not only
embedded in basic doctrines, it seems inherent in every major issue
of law. The objection to rooting it out is not, alone, that it would
244
make government worse (which, beyond some point, it would),
but that it would make government unrecognizable.2 5 Without
apology, I have no full-blown theory of state action to offer. But
for most of the cases actively litigated, we can find good guidance
in my Moral Exemplar Model, which develops the notion that fairness is a sort of public good, and government an exemplar of virtue.
24 4

See H. FRIENDLY, TnE DARTMouTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLICPEmBRnA 30 (1969) (reacting to Professor Elias Clark's proposal that all
large charities be subject to fourteenth amendment antidiscrimination obligations,
irrespective of their receipt of public financial aid):
Philanthropy is a delicate plant whose fruits are often better than its
roots; desire to benefit one's own kind may not be the noblest of motives but it is not ignoble. It is the very possibility of doing something different than government can do, of creating an institution free to make
choices government cannot-even seemingly arbitrary ones-without having to provide a justification that will be examined in a court of law, which
stimulates much private giving and interest. If the private agency must
be a replica of the public one, why should private citizens give it their
money and their time?
245 See supra note 7 and text accompanying notes 152-156.
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For those who want to lobby for a more radical effacement or
shift in the locus of the public/private boundary, there is opportunity for attack along the lines of unseating corporations from
their entitlement to ordinary constitutional liberties. Some of the
liberties that protect natural persons might not apply, or might
apply less stringently, when corporations and other associations of
various sorts are the claimants. The less heavily we weigh their
liberty claims, the more we would be justified to encumber them
with obligations.
Finally, it strikes me that the most complicated and perhaps
most important questions do not involve whether to retain these
two regions with their generally prevailing distinctions, but how
we allocate between them. On what principles is some conduct
shunted to one region, while other conduct goes to the other?
Consider price fixing by a state (for example, the marketing
plan involved in Parker v. Brown 246) and violations of worker

health and safety (for example, the conduct covered by OSHA).
Viewing the regulated conduct as delicts, the present posture of
the law, to restrict the liability exposure of government units, can
be interpreted consistently with my analysis of Region I. Although
excusing governments from compensation is silly, excusing them
from punitive judgments is not, whenever what is lost in judicial
,control is really compensated by stringent political accountability.
Yet, by altering our description of price-fixing and worker-jeopardizing only slightly, we could recharacterize the underlying misconduct with strong implications for the region to which we assign
them. Each can be viewed as involving not just a delict that affects
a discrete group of aggrieved persons, but as a defect of the actor's
character, the effects of which radiate throughout the entire society.
In regard to price-fixing, we might say the government is exemplifying substandard business ethics; in regard to worker safety, an
indifference to the well-being of persons. Under those constructions, the Moral Exemplar Model would seem to imply assigning
the conduct to the second region, in which the courts would deal
with the public actor more invasively and severely than the private
actor-not, as at present, the other way around.
Perhaps this final quandary only illustrates once more the uncertain basis of my regional cartography. Yet, may these uncertainties not be testament, too, to a vital quality of the law? The
divisions are unstable. Some of the most important developments
in the law have consisted in migrations back and forth between
246

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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my regions. Harms at one time relegated to torts (police brutality,
invasions of privacy) have been elevated, by recharacterization, to
constitutionally protected interests, first in such a way as to yield a
favorable evidentiary rule or injunction, and later, as through
section 1983, or Bivens, 247 back to a yet more expansive action in
tort. Conversely, we have examples of obligations originally demanded almost exclusively of governments, as a constitutional
matter, being generalized to all actors, through a sort of mirroring;
what is originally required of some actors constitutionally becomes
the required norm throughout the society by a mimicry in nonconstitutional doctrines of torts, crimes, and contracts. Conversely, the
obligations courts choose to impose on public actors through development of the Constitution may reflect (and magnify) the image
of acceptable conduct that has come to prevail in the private world.
Indeed, some instability of population, some migration from
one region to another, some imitative behavior, is not to be
wondered at, when we consider how many fundamental factors are
being played out along a public/private axis. The distinction is
involved in the continuous defining and redefining of the most
basic rights and remedies, liberties and liabilities, duties and disabilities, powers and privileges. Indeed, I do not doubt that if we
could see to origins, we would find what is public, what is private,
lying close to the heart of the human feelings that give rise to
governments.
24
7 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (upholding action for damages against federal agents who violated
plaintiff's fourth amendment liberties, notwithstanding absence of authorizing
statute).

